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This dissertation is an analysis of the deregulation process in the Argentine Merchant
Marine, considering the political, economical and social environment of its
occurrence; comparing the objectives and aims of the deregulation process with the
actual results, focusing on the consequences for seafarers, shipowners and unions.
A look is taken at the methods used to deregulate such a highly regulated business, and
the reasons for using them. The deregulation is examined in the light of the results and
trends that have taken place, while analysing the reform of the national public
administration, and the privatisation policy, its objectives and consequences.
A description and analysis of the consequences for seafarers and the unions is made.
The labour conditions and economic changes, the effects of the inapplicability of the
legal framework and the consequences of job reduction and affiliation rates are
explored to understand the outcomes and the trends. Additionally, the consequences for
shipowners and their business are examined and paralleled with the macroeconomic
environment of its occurrence. The most relevant shipping economic indicators are
analysed to understand the actual status of the business and the trends.
The concluding chapter examines and draws conclusions from the former ones,
analysing and describing the outcomes. Moreover, recommendations and possible
solutions are made based on the findings.
KEYWORDS: Deregulation, Privatisation, Seafarers, Unions, Shipowners,
Outflagging.
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1Chapter One
Introduction
Since the thirties', all the economic activities in Argentina have been highly regulated.
These regulations were due to a widely spread policy in Latin America, particularly in
Argentina, which was subsequently supported by the coming governments. Those
regulating policies tended to control every activity, especially those considered somehow
important for the country. Maritime activities were indeed considered among them, and
were highly regulated in all its aspects. Moreover, the merchant marine was considered of
strategic importance. Therefore the government felt the need to exercise total control over
it.
As a result of all the regulations enforced, the Argentine economy which once was among
the ten most developed economies of the world, started to decline. Argentina suffered
because of the imposed regulations and the extremely protective and closed economy,
with an increasing inflation rate that reached its highest peak in 1989. That was the
inflection point, and radical changes were badly needed in order to control and modify the
situation. It was at this stage, that the deregulation came about trying to solve the economic
problems. The Argentine Merchant Marine as a whole was slowly declining due to its
lack of competitiveness, and the shipping companies wanted a change that would enable
them to become more competitive. After the general deregulation of the economy, the
shipping companies made their way through and achieved the long awaited deregulation of
2the merchant marine. However, not everything came about as theory would have indicated,
and many a problem occurred. What were those problems affecting the merchant marine
and what was the cause behind them?. Were any solutions provided by the deregulation
and mainly, were the objectives of the deregulation fulfilled, are the basic questions,
which this dissertation is based upon.
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a view on the deregulation process in
Argentina and particularly of the Merchant Marine, focusing on the consequences for the
seafarers, shipowners and unions. This paper intends to create awareness among all the
interested parties in order to give a second thought to the deregulation process, its
consequences, trends, and possible outcomes. Moreover, the intention is to analyse the
actual status of the Argentine Merchant Marine, to identify the problems and their causes,
draw conclusions and recommend possible solutions.
In approaching such a current subject, there is always the danger of lack of sufficient or
updated material. In the research and development of this dissertation, the main drawback
was that there was no published material directly related to the subject. There was indeed
material referring to deregulation in general, and to the deregulation of the Argentine
economy. However, there was nothing written on the Argentine merchant marine in
general, or to seafarers, unions or shipowners in particular. Furthermore, when it comes to
statistics and data referring to Unions, especially ratings, it was almost impossible to
obtain accurate and updated material as keeping statistics is not an usual part of their job,
and many data was considered confidential. Therefore, the real core material was drawn
from the author's own experience on the subject, from personal interviews with the
representatives of every area involved, and the actual decrees and laws, as well as the
economic and statistical results. Statistical data supporting the sayings was searched from
3different Argentine sources, as the requirement of the research was to provide both old
and actual data for a broad analysis.
The objectives this dissertation aims to accomplish are, to identify the reasons for and the
characteristics of the deregulation process in Argentina, understanding its background and
special features, to examine the methods used in deregulating such a highly regulated
business. and to analyse the consequences and implications for seafarers, and the
consequences and implications for the shipowners and their business. Finally, the
objective was to draw conclusions and make recommendations based upon the findings of
the research.
Chapter two describes and analyses the deregulation process and its methodology, the
relation between the regulated economic environment, the shipping business and the
national fleet. Moreover, it provides an understanding and analysis of the general
deregulation of the economy and the laws that enabled the deregulation of the economy
and the Merchant Marine. It tackles the reform of the national pubic administration, its
quantitative and qualitative objectives, the privatisation policy, the convertibility law, and
the deregulation of the shipping business, its benefits, drawbacks, and consequences.
Chapter three describes and analyses the consequences for seafarers and the unions.
Furthermore, it highlights the economic and labour outcome for the seafarers market, new
working conditions and labour framework. It analyses the change and repercussion in
labour rights and jobs, the evolution of unemployment, wages, and social benefits, while
indicating and analysing the effects on the collective labour agreements, and the
elimination of nationality benefits for crews. The actual lack of seafarers and its future
consequences is analysed in "the sandwich pattern". The results for the unions and their
work that are shared with the seafarers are investigated. Moreover, the economic
4imbalance of the unions due to job reduction and fluctuation of the affiliation rates are
addressed as well.
Chapter four considers the consequences for shipownners and their business, starting with
the lobby towards the deregulation of the shipping business, and following with the
economical and political effect of the deregulation process on the Argentine shipowners.
Moreover, the net contribution of the Argentine Merchant Marine to the balance of
payments is analysed. The evolution of the total freight value generated by all means of
transport in relation to the freight value generated by Argentine ships is considered to
understand the trends of the business. The relation between the freights earned by
Argentine ships in relation to the ones earned by foreign ships are considered to
understand who is currently in command of the business, and why. Moreover, the
consequences on the national fleet are analysed together with the evolution of the G.R.T in
relation to the number of units in the Argentine fleet to have a clear picture of the possible
outcome. In addition, the consequences and implications for small shipowners due to the
deregulation process are established. Finally, the national shipping balance is analysed to
have a final verdict on the business.
To conclude, chapter five contains all the conclusions and recommendations drawn from,
and based on the analyses of the former chapters.
5Chapter 2.
The Deregulation Process in Argentina and its methodology
2.1 The highly regulated economic environment and its relationship with the shipping
business and the National Fleet.
The Argentine economy of the last half-century has characterised itself by a large
intervention of the State in market operations by means of multiple and changing regulations.
Most of those regulations were originated in the Thirties. For instance, in 1931 the
establishment of the currency exchange control enabled an absolute control by the State on
exchange, commercial services, and financial operations. In the following years, a great
number of instruments were used in order to adjust the demand and the supply of foreign
currency such as, double markets, foreign currency biting, multiple exchange rates, previous
import permits, prohibitions for importing superfluous goods, floating exchange rates. The
concept that certain resources generated by the private sector were public property,
prevailed at that time in the Argentine exchange market and economy, such as the mandatory
cession to the Central Bank of Argentina of all foreign currency generated by the exports, as
well as the oil production control, which was considered strategic.
Among other means to regulate the markets, quantitative rationalisation mechanisms were
frequently used, such as the oil quotas for the distilleries according to their installed
capacity. Likewise, a similar mechanism was used to distribute the cargo among national
shipowners according to the tonnage of their fleets. Restrictions on the consumption of
6certain products as well as regulations regarding the supply and export of raw materials and
farming products were established in order to isolate the domestic markets from the
fluctuations of international prices. Investment control schemes, subsided loans, and tax
exemptions, were tools used in an attempt to accelerate the development of industries
considered to be important in some way for the country during the fifties and sixties.
Furthermore, regulations trying to avoid oversupply of regional agricultural products
coexisted with norms posed to protect markets and incomes of different sectors.
In summary, during the thirties regulations were mainly oriented to control supply and export
of raw materials and farming products. During the period from the post-war to the sixties
regulations were biased to the exchange market, foreign commerce, transport, labour
relations, investments and tax exemptions. In the sixties and seventies, regulations were
directed to avoid oversupply of agricultural products and restrictions to different
commercial markets. Finally, during the eighties in the middle of an external debt explosion,
regulations were concerned mainly with external commerce, including taxation, fees, and
quantitative as well as qualitative restrictions. Therefore, by that time, there was almost no
area out of regulation in the Country.
As a result of all these regulations, Argentina has shown elevated static and dynamic
efficiency costs, and poor flexibility for assigning resources. The State was oversized and
deficitary, moreover, the combination of high inflation rates, reaching levels of
hyperinflation with consequences as grievous as to accelerate the handover of the
government to the newly elected authorities in 1989. The closed economy, and excessive
regulations, led to a high inefficiency of the markets, cost distortions, and low productivity
of the capital. Furthermore, in 1987, studies carried out by the Indec (Instituto Nacional de
Estadisticas y Censos), revealed more than 300 State-owned companies, financial
institutions, and insurance companies in which the State was total or majority owner, while
the National government owned 117 of them. For instance, according to data of the Ministry
of Economy, in 1989 the National Public Administration employed 1.000.000 agents,
corresponding to 350.000 in State owned companies and official bank institutions, 70.000 in
7public academic institutions, 25.000 in the public health system, 100.000 in security forces,
whereas all the rest were included in the governmental bureaucracy. Furthermore, according
to data provided by the Economic Planning Secretariat, consolidated public sector
expenditure reached its highest levels in the periods 1980-1983 and 1984-1988, at 32.4%
and 31% of GDP respectively.
In this extremely regulated environment, the Argentine Merchant Marine was no exception to
the rule. All aspects regarding shipping activities were highly regulated indeed. The Law
20094 (The Law of Navigation) was the general Legal framework, the Reginave (Regimen
de la Navegacion), a group of administrative, penal, and procedural norms regulating the
Law 20094. Ordenanzas Maritimas (Maritime Ordinances) are a set of periodical
publications updating the contents of the Reginave. However, the above mentioned
regulations are the usual norms regulating shipping activities.
Moreover, the State was directly or indirectly related to each and every activity within the
shipping business, its legal and labour framework and related activities. For instance, the
Unions’ collective Labour agreements, Contractual Law 20.744, “Ley de Reserva de cargas”
and Law 18.250 as amended by Law 19.877 (quota according to the tonnage) applicable to
all national shipowners. The Pilots association and work regulations regulated the entire
activity and implemented a State monopoly controlled via the Argentine Naval Prefecture.
Towage activities were highly regulated, resulting in an expensive, and most of the time
inefficient service. Furthermore, certain privileges and subsidies for national vessels were
implemented, such as rebates in bunkers and priority entrance to national ports.
The ports were all State owned, and extremely expensive and inefficient. Buenos Aires, the
main port, was considered a “dirty Port”. In fact, in 1990 a governmental study of port costs
at a national level with the view to privatisation estimated the costs at 5% of the total value
of exports for that same year. Moreover, the customs were bureaucratic and inefficient.
According to data of the General Taxation Directorate, in 1989 contraband, over- or sub-
invoicing of imports and exports accounted for losses to the State in the order of 60 % of the
total customs resources. The great rate of inflation led to permanent claims for wage
8increases being raised from the unions, producing deleterious effects on the activity, due to
the continuous discussions between unions and shipowners.
Maintenance and dredging of ports and waterways was a job shared between the MOP
(Ministry of Public Works), The Hydrographic Office, and the local authorities of the ports.
This approach lead to an overlapping of functions resulting in an lack of action that
according to the data provided by the “Boletin Fluvial” (official publication updating
hydrographic data) lead to all other ports having lesser depths than 20 years ago, except for
Bahia Blanca and Quequen.
Regarding the Argentine Fleet table 1 shows the evolution of the Argentine Merchant Marine
from the year 1979 to 1998 (provisional data).  It is implied from the data that there was a
tight link between the national fleet, the shipping business, and the State. In fact, the figures
for the G.R.T in 1979 were 2,889,000, in 1991 (the year of the deregulation) were
2,798,464 whereas for 1998 they were 1,658,114. This means that although the general trend
was to diminish the tonnage, due to the action of the State in a period of 12 years, the
reduction was only of 3.13%, whereas, in the period after the deregulation in 7 years time,
the reduction was 40.75% in the total G.R.T of the fleet. Moreover, considering the number
of units in 1979 there were 200, in 1991 149, and 76 in 1998, meaning a reduction of 25.5%
in a period of 12 years, whereas in the following period after the deregulation in 7 years
time, the reduction was 48.99%. All these facts contradict themselves with the
considerations that led to the deregulation process in the first place. Finally, the
methodology applied was mistaken and it didn’t work as far as the results are concerned.
SEE TABLE .1 at the end of the chapter.
2.2 The general deregulation of the economy
In the highly regulated context of Argentina, there was very little space for change or
innovation, if any, and a deregulation process was unthinkable. However, reality found its
way, and although the Argentine society as a whole was very reluctant to change due to the
fact that in such a regulated environment many privileges and conveniences had evolved for
9each and every sector. Nevertheless, the general economic chaos in July 1989 pushed the
already high inflation rate to the level of hyperinflation, 197 % /month (4900% yearly).
This hyperinflation induced such an abrupt devaluation that the country’s currency almost
evaporated and put the country close to the edge of social disintegration. It was necessary to
create a new currency to replace the Austral, which had sustained a total inflation of
5.100.000 per cent in 6 years. Moreover, it increased the total lack of confidence of the
citizens in the governing party. Therefore, the newly elected government (Peronista Party)
had to assume office six months in advance, as the former government in power (Radical
Party) led by President Raul Alfonsin, had no credibility whatsoever, and showed
themselves incapable of managing the situation.
Thus, since the very beginning of his government the newly elected President, Carlos Saul
Menem implemented a very broad and ambitious stabilisation, deregulation, and structural
reform plan. It started with the Law 23.696 Reform of the State-Administrative Emergency-
Privatisation and Private Capital Participation- Participated Property Program- Labour
Protection- Emergency Contracting- Ongoing Contracting- Concessions- Jobs Emergency
Plan, of August 17th 1989, followed by the Law 23697 “Economic Emergency” of
September the 1st 1989, which complemented and increased the former mainly by
eliminating all kinds of subsidies and / or privileges.  They both constituted the frame and
the tools for the structural reform of the State, restructuring of public finances, redefinition of
the role of the public and private sector, and the foundation for the coming legislation.
 I. The basic aspects of these two laws can be synthesised as follows:
A) An economic and administrative state of emergency was declared, thus enabling the
Executive Power to dispose of any measure necessary to overcome the crisis. On the basis
of these faculties, expressly delegated by the Parliament, the government adopted most of the
measures of administrative and economic reform, including the deregulation Decree
2284/91.
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B) Privatisation of the majority of the State-owned societies and companies, both industrial
and commercial (Ports, shipping, defence, steel industry), as well as, the service companies
(electricity, water, gas).
C) Subsidies of all kinds to the private sector were eliminated, whether special promotion
regimes to industrial activities, or regional promotions based on taxation and customs
benefits.
D) Basically these two laws made it possible to set the judicial basis for an open, and
competitive economy, dominated by the private sector. The government was empowered to
intervene in all public entities, authorising their dissolution or to alter their judicial and/or
organisational nature, for example, to turn a State Society into a limited company (SA). In
general, almost every measure related to the structural reform relies on the faculties
delegated by the Congress to the Executive.
II. The Reform of the Public National Administration
The Administrative reform program has been one of the main components of the structural
change of the economy. The organisation and working of the Public National Administration
reached its very bottom, to the point of a quasi paralysis of most of the services and a
general corruption. The main problems to solve were the following.
The reduced wages of the pubic sector were directly linked to the financial crisis of the
sector, as there were no means to retain the most qualified personnel.
The administrative organisation showed important signs of disarticulation as a consequence
of the multiple decision centres, excessive regulation and control functions, and grievous
social and union conflicts.
The essential functions of the Administration suffered due to the degradation of the
administrative organisation, which encouraged unusual levels of tax avoidance and customs
corruption. During 1989, according to the “Direccion General Impositiva” (taxation
collecting authority) VAT avoidance reached 70%, while income tax avoidance reached
85%. Decisions taken by the government lost strength and effectiveness due to the condition
of the Public Administration, mainly noticeable in social services, which left the least
favoured social classes without the required social safety net.
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The entering into force of the administrative reform program required the implementation of
a number of successive measures.
The decree No.435 of 1990 froze all vacancies, actual and future in the Public
Administration. Moreover, it implemented a strict system for contract control and
acquisitions in order to reduce the public expenditure. Simultaneously, a monetary reform
was implemented; it exchanged bank deposits for long term bonds (called the BONEX plan).
Likewise, secretariats and sub-secretariats were reduced in number, ending up with a total
of 36 secretariats and 8 ministries, while centralising as far as possible the decision making
capacity.
Four months later, the decree No.1757 constituted the “Comite Ejecutivo de Contralor de la
Reforma Administrativa” (Administrative Reform Control Executive Committee) with
powers to formulate and apply a deep restructuring Program. However, the decree No. 2476
of November 1990 gave the final profile to the Administrative Reform Program. This
Decree clearly defines the objectives for the re-organisation of the Public Administration.
Moreover, it declared the caducity of the whole structure of the Public Administration
involving 550.000 people, who were technically fired. The actual measures involved the
total reorganisation of all the services under the scope of a substantive increment of their
efficiency.
The quantitative objectives were the following:
· All transitory personnel and staff under contract were suppressed, meaning 30.000
jobs less, and a reduction by 33% of permanent staff, excluding educational,
medical, security, and customs staff.
· Limitation in the number of National Directorates to a number of 3 for each
Secretariat.
· To limit the educational staff to match only the real demands.
The institutional strengthening and personnel increment of the taxation organisation.
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The qualitative objectives were the following:
· Unification of the services in charge of the technical and financial resources of each
Ministry in order to control and make more efficient the public expenditure.
· Limitation in the number of supporting positions to 33% of the total positions within
each administrative unit, in order to establish a reasonable proportion in relation to the
personnel in substantive positions.
· To avoid overlapping of functions by adoption of the “exclusive responsibility”
principle.
· Incrementing the standards for personnel selection, at the same time matching wages
with the ones paid in the private sector for similar responsibilities.
· The adoption of a new labour system based on responsibility, evaluation and
performance, abolishing the so-called “labour stability”, which in practice meant
that it had been impossible to fire an administrative employee.
In conclusion, the Public Administrative Reform was indeed one of the greatest, if not the
greatest challenge of the whole deregulation process, mainly because of its magnitude, but
partly also due to the historical resistance of the Argentine society to change established
structures. Nevertheless, it was a very successful reengineering in terms of achieving its
structural objectives.
However, although the objectives were reached, many unexpected consequences and
developments prevented the Public Administration from achieving the expected level of
performance. As an example, the wages paid were not actually comparable to the ones in the
private sector, mainly due to the economic problems and to the different levels of
remuneration (layered remuneration), which lacked the flexibility of the private sector. The
reduction of the staff, both transitory and permanent, was based on cost reduction rather than
on competence. Therefore, the reduction was mainly in young, well trained, and competitive
professionals instead of older, unqualified, but more expensive to compensate, staff.
Moreover, the Public Administration, although never officially recognised, has long worked
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as a concealed unemployment subsidy. Therefore, a massive firing of public employees
without a proper social safety net in place was surely to have sour consequences.
III. The Privatisation Policy
The privatisation of the majority of the State-owned societies and companies, both industrial
and commercial, was specifically stated in the “Law for Reform of the State” No. 23696 of
August 1989. It introduced a long-range plan to carry out over 200 privatisations and service
concessions over 7 years. However, during the years 1990 and 1991 the privatisation
process was concentrated to just a few cases.
The most relevant of them all was ENTEL (The National Telecommunications Company)
due to its importance and complexity. Moreover, the process developed in a context of great
difficulties especially due to the inflation peaks of late 1989 and March 1990. The lack of
macroeconomic stability had a bad impact on the quality and quantity of the offers, as the
country-risk to cover was very high. Organisational difficulties, such as inventories
weighting, financial and operational debt, and regulatory constrains got into the way.
Likewise, substantial matters such as tariff policy were negotiated at the last moment,
representing a great negotiation disadvantage. Nevertheless, the privatisation was made
according to the time frames established, and for a nominal amount of about 6.000 million
US dollars, mainly paid with debt bonds.
Regarding the success of this privatisation, the method to privatise was not the very best as
only two companies were allowed to work in the market. Moreover, they didn’t compete
between themselves because the country was divided in two areas, the north for “France
Telecom”, and the south for “Telefononica de España”. Therefore, there was no competition
whatsoever, but two different monopolies instead. Another questionable feature was that
both the domestic and international services were operated by the same companies, which
lead to a dangerous manipulation of tariffs. This resulted in an inflation of domestic tariffs to
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compensate reductions in the international ones, in which the competition was fierce,
therefore, harming the local users.
From the very beginning, a very significant policy was implemented regarding the state oil
company. In fact, the decision to incorporate private capital in the exploration of new
productive areas was the prologue to the entire deregulation of the oil market in the first
quarter of 1990.
Before the deregulation, the market was very much limited by a complex quota system and
fixed prices in distillation and retailing of gasoline. The company had refineries, drilling
gear, unused oil pipelines, ships, aircrafts, shipyards, hangars, and even supermarkets, clubs
and hospitals. In 1990 the operative losses were over 700 million US dollars. Therefore, the
main objectives were focused on turning all its unproductive assets into liquid assets.
Finally, after the deregulation process, a convergence between domestic and international
prices was promptly achieved. Moreover, private companies were allowed to opt between
selling in the local or international market. Likewise, the deregulation of the oil market
allowed, in the second half of 1990, the privatisation of the central areas of the State
Company. This meant a great inflow of cash at a moment when it was heartily needed to
consolidate the economic stabilisation.
The privatisation of YPF (State Oil Company) was a great success in terms of the process
itself, as with the previous experience of the Telecommunications Company, the state was
aware of the dangers involved. Therefore, for placing the shares in the market, instead of
using the “Dutch Auction” method that proved problematic in the ENTEL case, the “Book
building” method was used. The main problem with the former method was that the
involvement of speculators and poorly experienced investors rocketed the prices of the
shares only to fall down to reasonable market prices soon after the selling. This fact
compromised the future privatisations. Therefore, the latter method assured a selling price
close to the one advised by traditional analytic methods. Furthermore, in order to avoid
speculative oscillations, a second offer was announced for holders of pension bonds.
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In conclusion, the relevance of the privatisation of YPF was that it opened the doors of the
international capital markets to Argentina. The success of the placing operation of the shares
brought about a greater knowledge of the country on the external markets. In fact, since 1993,
the inflow of capital from around the world has accelerated. Moreover, in January 1994 the
country-risk was reduced to a level where the internal cost of capital became similar to that
of the traditionally most stable economies.      (Figure.1)
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Figure. 1.  Country risk is calculated as the spread between the yield on BONEX 1989 and LIBOR
Source: Estudio Macroeconomica
Furthermore, the group of local banks involved in the operation, gained experience and
professionalism which were later useful, not only in other offers, but in bond emissions and
negotiable obligations in external markets as well. Finally, an indirect effect of the
privatisation of YPF was to facilitate the financing of the productive restructuring of the
country, which otherwise would have turned into a slow and costly road.
It can be said that the privatisation of YPF and ENTEL were the flagships of the
privatisations in Argentina. However, many other companies and activities of lesser
importance were privatised as well. Iberia of Spain acquired Aerolineas Argentinas, the
national airline, and its acquisition was mainly made by capitalisation of external debt. The
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television channels numbers 11 and 13, and various minor companies related to the Ministry
of Defence were given in concession. One third of the national roads network, almost 9.000
kilometres, were given in concession for its maintenance and development. Moreover, the
whole railway system was also given in concession, including the one from the city of
Rosario to Bahia Blanca, 5.000 kilometres, which enables transport of up to one third of the
wheat production and other crops to the port of Bahia Blanca for its export.
The energy and gas sectors were transferred to the provinces first, and afterwards given in
concession under a tariff system. This means that these sectors were originally considered
national, whereas lately they became provincial. The tariff system consists of, all other
parameters being equal, giving the concession to the company offering the lowest tariff to the
customers. There are many more examples of privatised companies. However, enumerating
each and every one of them falls outside the scope of this work.
In conclusion, the privatisation plan was a great success in terms of reducing the State
participation in every sector. Furthermore, these plans yielded US dollars 21 billion to the
State, US dollars 10.672 million in cash, US dollars 3.478 million in debt securities at
market value, and US dollars 6.795 million in securities redeemed at par value. Therefore,
not only did the privatisation process represent a great financial help at a moment when it
was badly needed, but it lifted off the State the great burden of financing a whole lot of loss
making companies representing an enormous saving that was formerly financed by monetary
emissions. However, there were certain drawbacks, such as the increment of tariffs after the
privatisations in order to finance investments. The difficulty and inefficiency of the
regulating entities in being able to actually defend the consumer’s interests are arising
controversy over the process.
IV. The Convertibility Law
The adoption of the monetary convertibility system in 1991 under the Law 23.928 was the
most important decision towards the stabilisation of the Argentine economy. Under the
aforementioned Law, the parity of the peso to the US dollar was fixed to a ratio of one peso
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to one dollar. Thus, each Argentine peso in circulation has to be backed by reserves (foreign
currency and gold). Moreover, no less than two thirds of the monetary base has to be backed
by liquid reserves (foreign currency, gold, and term deposits at fair market value). No
indexation is allowed, and a total freedom to enter into contracts in foreign currency has
been granted, being enforceable under the Argentine law.
The principle behind the convertibility is that there is no possibility of printing currency, if
not properly backed. Hence, there is no possibility of financing with monetary emission and,
therefore, no devaluation of the currency occurs, which had far long been the problem in the
past. In order to achieve this goal, the Central Bank shall be autonomous and neither finance
the Treasury deficit, nor act as guarantor to the central or any other government. The Central
Bank shall only be authorised to issue money to purchase dollars, operating as a
Compensating Entity. This golden rule has been followed to the letter even during the
Mexican Crisis (95/96). Furthermore, the elimination of the fiscal deficit as an inflation-
generating factor has been paramount for the system to work properly.
Opening up to foreign capital was a major concern. Therefore, all restrictions and taxes on
foreign investments have been eliminated. Actually the system grants that funds can enter and
leave the country freely, while foreign and domestic capital is granted equal treatment under
the law. Furthermore, there are no exchange rates controls, nor differential exchange rates
for import and exports. As no controls apply over foreign currency, there is, therefore, a free
market for currency. No prohibitions at all apply to import or export of goods and services,
and an important cut has been made in custom duties.
Finally, all markets were deregulated, restrictions were eliminated on interest rates, capital
markets, domestic markets for goods, services and state regulatory entities. Moreover,
restrictions were eliminated on prices and salary controls, together with subsidies and
preferential tax agreements, which hindered the evolution of free markets. In conclusion, all
the above mentioned measures were mainly oriented to stabilise the economy, and none of
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them would have been possible if it wasn’t for the Convertibility Law which made it
possible to reduce the inflation rate from 4924 % in 1989 to 0,3 % in 1997.  (Figure. 2)
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Figure 2.  Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic
It is important to note that the deregulation plan was able to be implemented due to a number
of factors different in nature. The main factor was the economical chaos, which reached the
very bottom, and therefore, some immediate measures were required. At the same time
mainly due to the economic situation, people’s minds changed to accept radical economical
and structural changes. Not only did they then accept them, but asked for the changes.
Moreover, the parliamentary majority obtained in the 1989 elections enabled the government
to pass all the necessary laws to push forward the process. Later on, in 1990   the number of
the members of the Supreme Court of Justice was increased from 5 to 9 members. In 1994,
the reform of the Constitution of 1853, which allowed a second period in office for the
president provided the political continuity required for the strengthening and maturing of the
deregulation process.
Finally, although all factors involved were important and contributed to the plan, the main
ones were, the support of the people for the plan and the new governing party, due to the
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extreme situation, and the increased number of members of the Supreme Court of Justice, as
was later proved when different appeals were made against different deregulation decrees.
In fact, during the whole deregulation process, many appeals were made against many of the
measures implemented specially all those pushed forward by decrees, which were a
majority. Just as an example, in the maritime field, all the Unions appealed against the
decree 1772/91, and some of them against the decree 817/92. However, although the appeals
were successful in the first instance, after going all the way to the Supreme Court they were
finally dismissed. It appears evident that the final verdict was political, rather than related to
a matter of justice. Finally, each and every claim against the substance or the procedures
followed by the government to push forward the deregulation followed the same fate. Hence,
the deregulation process was possible due to the historical, political, and economical
moment.
Many of the features of the deregulation process are more than questionable, and there is no
doubt that they will be questioned regardless of the results, but especially if the final results
are not the expected ones. Therefore, although a very necessary and awaited process, the
methodology implemented was far from correct or legal. It has not been without harm to the
people or the institutions, especially to justice.
Finally, overruling the Law, even with the consent of a partial Supreme Court of Justice, is
something that may work for a very short period of time, or for a certain problem. However,
it will invariably work against the system in the medium and long term and it will be very
difficult to invoke the law to work for us after overruling it. Moreover, other people may
feel that is the path to solve their immediate problems and think they have the same right,
creating an endemic never-ending institutional problem, which will be a heavy legacy for the
coming generations.
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2.3 The deregulation of the shipping business
In the “Law for Reform of the State” No. 23696 of August 1989, ELMA S.A (the National
Liner Fleet) was considered in its Annex I for partial or total privatisation. Moreover, the
whole tanker fleet was included in the aforementioned Law for the privatisation of YPF
(National Oil Company). YCF (National Coal Company) was also included in the law, but
its importance as a fleet was negligible. These facts indicated the final and total withdrawal
of the State from the shipping activities, leaving it all to the private sector. This was the
beginning of the major crisis of the Argentine merchant marine in its whole history,
aggravated by wrong, and/or wrongly implemented policies.
In early September 1991, the Executive Power dictated the decree 1772 / 91, which enabled
the flagging out of the Argentine fleet, to flags of convenience, while maintaining the
privileges of national ships. In that Decree, the considerations reflected very accurately the
reality of the merchant marine. However, the only solution considered was the reduction of
crew, as if the labour costs were the one and only problem. In that very same month and as if
it was a different story, the Law 23977 was published in the Official Bulletin where the
conventions and recommendations of the ILO (International Labour Organisation) No. 163,
164, 165, 166, 173, and 174 regarding the welfare of seafarers at sea and ports, medical
assistance, social security and repatriation were adopted, conveying a double message
inconsistent with the actual policies.
The policies implemented with the Decree 1772 / 91 were continued in the Decree 817 / 92
regarding ports and maritime deregulation. Invoking the Laws 23696 (Reform of the State)
and 23697 (Economic emergency), and overruling constitutional principles (a decree has no
pre-eminence over a law), it repealed articles of the Law of Navigation 20094. It suspended
all the collective labour agreements in all maritime, port and fishing activities. It defined the
Labour Contractual Law as a ceiling for the labour rights of the workers, instead of a floor,
going against the essence of labour rights. Moreover, this same Decree, when repealing
arts.142 and 143 of the Law of Navigation, enabled foreign seafarers without residence in
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the country to sign on in Argentine merchant ships. Furthermore, it allowed the interpretation
of Art. 112 of the Law 20094 and its amendments, which established that only Argentine
citizens could be employed as masters or officers, as if it was repealed. The Ministry of
Economy confirmed such an interpretation in 1994.  Furthermore, the decree 817 / 92 is
complemented by the decree 1264 / 92, which suspends all collective labour agreements and
acts, which are not specified in Annex III of the decree 817 / 92.
In August 1992, the Register for Foreign Ships and Naval Artefacts was created under the
decree 1493 / 92, later amended in some of its articles by the decree 2265 / 92, which
enabled the access of foreign vessels to coastal sailing traffic and maritime fishing, this
feature being almost unique in the world. All these regulations were made with the intention
to reduce costs. However, the results were not the expected ones. On the contrary, great
harm was done to the State in the loss of taxes due to the fact that tax control on outflagged
vessels is almost impossible. In 1994, the Executive Power tried to put forward a law
project to create a Special Argentine Register for vessels. However, this latter project had
no support from any of the involved sectors and was regarded as being too far from creating
any benefit to any of the involved parties.
In conclusion, from the facts presented it is clear that the Argentine merchant marine, as
almost every activity in the country, had previously been highly regulated. Although the aim
was to develop a healthy merchant marine under the auspices of the State, reality proved
otherwise. Therefore, the need for a radical change was there, and the opportunity came
about in 1991 based on the Law 23.696 (Reform of the State) and Law 23.697 (Economic
Emergency) of 1989.
However, the methodology used to carry out such deregulation is far from orthodox and
sometimes illegal. The wish to push forward the process was greater than any other
consideration. In fact, the Decree 1772/91 enables flagging out the fleet while at the same
time maintaining all privileges of national ships, which is a contradiction in its own terms.
The only cost reduction solution considered was the reduction of crew. Consequently, of the
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15 articles of the Decree, 6 are related to the crew (arts. 7,8,9,10,12 and 13), whereas all
other flag privileges are maintained.
Moreover, invoking necessity and urgency, the Decrees 1772/91 and 817 /92 overruled the
National Constitution. In fact, the aforementioned decrees overruled the National
Constitution in its Art. 67 inc.12 which gives to the Congress the right to regulate the
maritime commerce; arts. 36 and 37, as those Decrees assumed legislative attributions
conferred to the National Congress by the Constitution, and was in violation of art. 86 inc.2,
which attributes to the Executive Power the functions to instruct and regulate as necessary
for the execution of the law, taking care not to alter their spirit with regulatory exceptions.
Moreover, a number of laws were violated in the same process.
The Law 20.094 (Navigation Law) was overruled in its articles 55, 56, 71, 73, 104, 142,
143, 144 and 625 mainly establishing facts either not contemplated or against its articles.
The Law 18.250 (cargo reservation) as amended by law 19.877, was overruled in its art.1,
which established the requirement of being under the national flag to benefit from it. There
was also a violation of the decree 19.492 as ratified by law 12.980, which reserves the
cabotage traffic for Argentine ships. Finally, the law 20.447 is violated in its art.1, which
states that the country reserves for itself the right to transport up to 50% of the total external
commerce transported by sea.
From the available facts, it is, therefore, implied that there was a desperate need for change.
However, from the aforementioned facts it is also very clear that the willingness to bring it
about was greater than any other consideration whatsoever. This deregulation, was the
logical consequence of a real need for change, which in time had a great support from the
citizens, but the methodology was such that it lacked legitimacy and set the ground for future
disputes and controversies. Moreover, if the results of the deregulation are not satisfactory,
as they are not, the whole process would be jeopardised because of the way, and the method
used for its implementation. In the graphs derived from table 2.1, the evolution of the
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Argentine fleet is shown in order to analyse the results and the trends in the light of the
available data.
From Figure.3 it is noticeable, that the diminishing size of the fleet has been dramatic from a
total of 200 units in 1979, to 149 in 1991, and a total of 76 in 1998 (provisional), being a
total reduction of 62% in the total number of units. Although the general tendency was to
reduce the number, the gradient of the curve becomes much sharper from 1991 on.
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Figure 3.  Source table .1
Regarding the age of the vessels, Figure. 4  shows that this has risen from an average of 14,3
years in 1979 to an average of 15,6 years in 1991 and 17,16 years in 1998, being an increase
of 2,86 years in the average age, and in percentile values 20%. From the graphs, it is clear
that the trends have been consistent, the age and the number have increased and decreased
respectively. Nevertheless, the years 1990/91 were the point of inflection of all parameters
and where the trends became sharper.
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Evolution of the Age of the Argentine Fleet
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Moreover, in Figure. 5 it is clear that the G.R.T has been consistently decreasing from
2.889.000 in 1979 to 2.798.464 in 1991, and 1.658.114 in 1998 being a reduction of 42,6%
in the total G.R.T. In short, the G.R.T has been irregularly decreasing until 1991 when the
fall really sharpened.
     Percentage Variations in the Argentine fleet (79/91- 91/98)
 Table 2.
Years 1979-1991 1991-1998 Trend
Units (-)25.5% (-)48.99% Decrease
G.R.T (-)3.13% (-)40.75% Decrease
Av. Age (+)9.10% (+)10% Increase
Period 12 Years 7 Years
  Source table .1
In table 2. the values for Number of Units, Gross Registered Tonnage, and Average Age of
the Argentine fleet are indicated for two different periods, the period prior to the
deregulation process 79/91 and the period after the deregulation 91/98. The variations are
shown as increasing or decreasing percentages of the original values for the period. At a
first glance, it is noticeable that the percentage variations before the deregulation are much
more moderate in value than after the process. Moreover, a reduction in the number of units
by 25.5% in a 12 year period, (prior to deregulation) may seem huge. However, during the
same period the reduction in G.R.T was only 3.13%. Therefore, there was a reduction in the
number of units, but an increase in the size of the ships, which almost compensates the
tonnage. In conclusion, the decreasing values of the units and G.R.T before the deregulation
are insignificant when compared to the values after the deregulation. Furthermore, the
average age, of the fleet increased by 9.1% for the earlier period and by 10% in the
following period. This means that the trend was not interrupted by the deregulation process,
but even accelerated. The only real objective achieved by the deregulation and privatisation
process was to reduce the State participation in the total Argentine fleet, which was reduced
from 40.86 %, to 10.14 % for the period 1991/1998.
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In the considerations of the decree 1772 / 91, which enabled the flagging out of the Argentine
Fleet, the reality of the merchant marine was accurately reflected. Among other
considerations, it stated that the deregulation was a necessity because many national
shipowners were requesting deregistration of their vessels, that the tonnage was very low
and the trend was to descend. The considerations also stated that the main cause was the lack
of competitiveness of the Argentine vessels due to their operational costs, and that “it was
necessary to reverse this situation because of the paramount economical and political
importance of the National merchant marine for the Country”.
From the considerations it was likely to think that the decree would be the solution to all the
problems affecting the Argentine merchant marine. However, what is particularly
suspicious, is the fact that at the time of the deregulation, the effects of privatisation and
deregulation on Merchant Marines were already known, for instance, by the experiences in
Western Europe and Africa. Therefore, there is no excuse for the government to have
believed that the deregulation was going to be the solution for the Merchant Marine.
Furthermore, what is even harder to understand is the willingness and support the shipping
companies, especially the larger companies, gave to the deregulation process of the
Argentine Merchant Marine, with the knowledge of prior experiences in the World. There is,
therefore, ground to question which was the ultimate goal of the deregulation process.
As an example of the knowledge of the possible outcomes of deregulation and the following
outflagging, a comparison between the Argentine and the UK Registries is provided.
2.5 Comparison of the Argentine and UK Registries
When deregulating the shipping activities in Argentina previous experiences from around the
world should have been taken into account. Although there were certain purely Argentinean
phenomena, like hyperinflation, the examples would still have been useful as a guide, and
especially for getting an idea of the possible outcomes. There are indeed some examples of
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the effects of the deregulation and privatisation policies in different Merchant Marines,
especially in Western Europe and Africa.
There is not any Registry that exactly matches the occurrences in the Argentine Register.
However, the outcomes of other registries that experienced some of the occurrences or
similar ones are good for a comparison. In that respect, the UK Registry has gone through
some of the same developments that the Argentine Registry has done. Nevertheless, good
note should be taken of the big differences between the two registries and developments, the
big advantage being that the developments in the UK Registry had taken place some time
before the Argentine deregulation, and therefore, was a good precedent to draw conclusions
from. Another important feature is the documentation available regarding the developments
in the British merchant marine, which makes it more accurate.
It is very interesting to note the concern that the UK has devoted to the consequences in their
merchant marine. Moreover, there is a report from the Transport Committee of the House of
Commons dated 13 May 1987 and 27 May 1988, which thoroughly analyses and explains
many of the features affecting the British merchant marine. It is very interesting to see that
many of the features mentioned in the report are the ones affecting the Argentine merchant
marine as well.
Basically, the main difference between the Argentine situation and the UK, are the
macroeconomic framework and the time of the occurrences. While the first difference is a
drawback for the comparison, the second one is an advantage, as it becomes a useful
precedent. It is very clear that the main common issue for both Registers is the flagging out
of the fleet, and most of the following problems were derived therefrom.
Flagging-out:
Although not a new phenomenon for the UK, the pace was accelerated in the period 1987-
1988. In fact, according to data provided by the General Council of British Shipping, at the
end of 1982, 86% of the UK-owned fleet was mainland registered, but by August 1987 the
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figure had fallen to 35%. The main difference with the Argentine Register is that the
flagging-out of the UK fleet was to dependant territories such as the Isle of Man and Channel
Islands, whereas the Argentine fleet was flagged-out to flags of convenience. However, the
phenomena were very similar regarding the consequences on the Merchant Marine and fleet.
The criteria used by the UK shipowners were indeed very similar to those of the Argentine
ones, that is, to reduce manning costs either by changing to cheaper crews or by renegotiating
terms and conditions with the unions. For example Shell Tankers UK, flagged out to the Isle
of Man and now obtains seafarers through a third party manning agency, which has entered
into agreements with the British unions. Personnel savings arise from the abolishment of a
substantial part of the leave and other side payments.
On the other hand, Shell Tankers UK is able to retain a pool of experienced British seafarers
and to maintain links with the recruiting and training facilities in the UK. Therefore, in the
present conditions it seems more convenient for UK shipowners to flag out to the Isle of
Man, than to Flags of convenience. However, some UK shipowners had taken the
opportunity to employ their crews under foreign management. This means, of course, that
foreign crews may be employed.
It is interesting to see the correlation that the aforementioned developments have with the
ones affecting the Argentine shipowners. Argentina has no second Registry like the Isle of
Man, but has set up a special status for the Argentine owned outflagged ships called
“transitory cease of flag”. That regime has both the advantages of Flags of convenience and
some of the ones granted by the Argentine Registry, which in practice has a similar outcome
to the British approach. Furthermore, the approach towards personnel is very similar too.
The Argentine shipowners had chosen to maintain the Argentine crews, sometimes through
agreements with the unions or by imposing their conditions in a shipowners’ market.
Nevertheless, same as the UK shipowners, they have left the door open to the possibility of
changing crews.
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The main purpose of this comparison is not to make a scientific correlation between the
causes and effects of the UK and Argentinean Registries. The purpose is to illustrate the fact
that the outcome and effects of the policies implemented in Argentina were already known in
the world at the time of implementing them, and that this knowledge must have been taken
into account.
The declining of the fleet:
According to the data provided by the Department of Transport Statistics bulletin (87) 50,
Table 1.1(ii), the number of UK-registered ships has been declining since the beginning of
this century. However, the total tonnage continue to grow, until it reached a peak in 1975. It
began to decline from 1980, and for the period 1986-87-88 the decline was dramatic. In fact,
in 1975 the dwt was 51,9 millions. It had dropped to less than half by 1984 and halved again
between 1984 and 1986 to 11,2 m dwt. The number of units on the UK Register also
dropped by half between 1975 and 1984 and then declined by a further 30% between 1984
and 1986.
Regarding the Argentine fleet, the G.R.T has been consistently decreasing from 2.889.000 in
1979 to 2.798.464 in 1991, and 1.658.114 in 1998, being a reduction of 42,6% in the total
G.R.T. In short, the G.R.T has been irregularly decreasing until 1991 when the fall really
sharpened due to the deregulation process. Therefore it is clear that the tendencies both
fleets were to decline, but there is always an inflection point where the decline becomes
sharper, that is the outflagging of the two fleets.
Age of the vessels:
According to data provided by Maritime Transport OECD, together with the decline in the
UK fleet there has been a lack of investment. The UK fleet changed between 1975-1986 from
being substantially below the world average age to being considerably above. As an
example, Table shows the trend.
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Average age of the world and UK owned and registered fleets (100 grt+)
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Total 11.0    8.7 10.5
9.1
11.4
9.7
11.5  10.1 11.6  10.5 11.8  12.1
W        UK W       UK W       UK W       UK W       UK W       UK
Table  Source GCBS statistical briefs, date as at June each year
It is once again noticeable that regardless of the differences, the trend was the same as for
the Argentine Fleet, i.e. an increasing age as time went by. However, the Argentine situation
was much graver as the fleet was already old before the deregulation process and
subsequent flagging-out. The age of the vessels has risen from an average of 14,3 years in
1979 to an average of 15,6 years in 1991 and 17,16 years in 1998, being an increase of 2,86
years in the average age, and in percentile values 20%. It is clear that the trends have been
consistent, the age has consistently increased. Nevertheless, the years 1990/91 were the
point of inflection of all parameters where the trends became sharper.
Employment:
When considering the decline of the fleet and its consequences in the employment among
seafarers the similarity of the outcomes between the UK and the developments in the
Argentine Merchant Marine is really impressive. In fact, the decline in the UK fleet was
mirrored by a contraction of the seafaring workforce. Between 1975 and 1986, the total
number of UK seafarers employed on UK-registered ships fell by two thirds, with the largest
drop occurring in the second half of that period. In 1975 the total number of UK seafarers
employed was 7340, whereas in 1981 it was 5370 and in 1986 2380, according to data
provided by GCBS. It is more than a coincidence that the same consequences were
registered in two different scenarios at different times.
Considering 1991 as the starting point, the unemployment in the Argentine Merchant Marine
was very low and the number of units, although decreasing, still considerable. The tendency
in 1992 was very logical, with a decrease in the number of units, the unemployment
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increased. From 1992 to 1993 the trend was the same but much softened which was already
rather curious. However, in 1994 both tendencies jointly started to decrease. This outcome
is very similar to the one in the UK seafarers market.
Contribution to the Balance of Payments:
According to the Maritime Charitable Foundation (BCMF) the shipping industry regards its
true contribution to the UK balance of payments as the sum of export earnings plus import
savings which takes into account the UK owners’ revenues on goods imported to the UK.
The contribution to the balance of payments defined in this way has been fairly constant in
money terms over the last 10 years. In real terms it has fallen about one third from that in
1975, as more overseas freights have gone to foreign shipowners and cross trade revenues
have reduced following the reduction in the UK fleet.
In the case of Argentina, data provided by the International accounting Directorate of the
Secretary of Economic Planning of the Ministry of Economy indicate that up to 1990 the
shipping balance was positive, while in 1991 it was almost break even, with a very small
profit. However, since 1992 the shipping balance has shown increasingly negative results
which actually signifies that the expenses had increased a lot, because the income, although
slightly reduced, has been fairly steady since 1993. Therefore, the main cause for the
negative results are freights earned by foreign ships for the transport of Argentine imports,
and chartering of foreign ships by national shipowners. In conclusion, the results of the
balance of payments differ according to the way that the data is considered. However,
although the UK contribution seems better off in spite of the flagging out, the trend indicates
that sooner or later the balance of payments will be affected. Nevertheless this issue seems
to be the biggest difference between the UK and the Argentine situations.
In conclusion, all the items considered in this comparison will be lately considered in depth
for the Argentine Merchant Marine. However, the real goal is to provide the argument that
the possible outcomes that affect the Argentine Merchant Marine could have been avoided if
the precedents like the one presented, would have been taken into account.
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Against the background of the facts presented in this chapter, it is very easy to understand the
willingness of the government in deregulating the whole economy and related activities.
There was, indeed, a strong need for change and deregulation and privatisation were useful
tools in order to overcome all the problems affecting the country. However, it seems that the
same approach was applied to all activities in the country without paying attention to their
peculiarities. The living proof of the latter fact, is the disastrous effects on the national
merchant marine. As was mentioned before, there were previous experiences from
deregulation and privatisation of merchant marines around the world, and their effects were
already known. So the reasons that lead to implementation of a similar scheme are not very
clear and require further analysis and some guessing, as nobody has yet come up with a
suitable explanation.
There is no plain answer to the question of why the deregulation was applied to the
Argentine Merchant Marine in such a way. Nevertheless, there are two main possibilities on
the part of the government. The first one is that the government was trying to get rid of the
merchant marine altogether in a concealed way. The second option was a total lack of
understanding of, and care for, the shipping activities. This second option, although it may
seem very naive at first sight, has historically been the case in Argentina, especially when
trying to solve economic problems, it has been very common that policies which have
already failed around the world, are applied. The reasons for this has largely been the belief
that the Argentine situation was something special and different from other parts of the
world, although the results proved them wrong.
On the part of the shipowners, it is hard to believe that there was a lack of knowledge. The
problem there, must have been the second cause, the belief that the Argentine situation was
different from the ones of Western Europe and Africa, for instance. Besides, the long period
during which the Merchant Marine was protected had created a certain kind of confidence in
the shipowners and the belief that their market was not interesting for foreign carriers, which
was only true because it was highly regulated. However, after the deregulation it became
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extremely attractive to global carriers. Therefore, in the opinion of the author, nothing other
than a misguided thinking and over-confidence could have lead the Argentine shipowners to
support a policy, which induced such deleterious effects on the merchant marine and their
own business. Therefore, there are no other suitable explanations for the implementation of
the total deregulation of the Argentine Merchant Marine.
Although the considerations of the deregulation decrees were very laudable, the actual facts,
figures, and trends are saying something very different to the point that they are contradictory
in their own terms. If the considerations of the decree were really honest, which does not
seem to be the case, the actual situation is even worse and more complicated than before, as
there is no way back. Finally, none of the initial intentions, except for the reduction of State
participation, were fulfilled, and in the light of the lack of action, concern, involvement, and
support of the government it should be, therefore, correct to imply that there is a great dose
of cynicism in it all, if not actual fault, and no interest at all in the fate of the Argentine
merchant marine.
In conclusion, from the aforementioned facts, is clear that the deregulation process was a
necessity in macroeconomic terms for the country; moreover, it has been successful in many
ways. However, when it comes to particular cases, such as the Merchant Marine, special
care and attention should have been paid to the particularities of the business and to the
antecedents and examples of around the world, before implementing any policy that could
affect the business for ever. Therefore, a good tool for controlling the economy became the
wrong tool when implemented to the context of the Argentine Merchant Marine. Thus, a good
concept like privatisation and deregulation, became a bad concept for the Merchant Marine.
Furthermore, is sad to see that the developments after the general deregulation of the
economy are not as auspicious as they used to be for the Argentine economy in general,
especially due to wrongly implemented policies.
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Chapter 3
The Consequences and Implications of the deregulation for the Seafarers
and Unions
3.1 The economic and labour consequences for the seafarers’ market, and new
working conditions
As soon as the Argentine ships were outflagged to flags of convenience, in most cases
Panama or Liberia, the Argentine personnel had to carry out the option anticipated in
the decree 1772/91 in order to continue on board the ships under foreign flags. The
option for the crews was to ask for an extraordinary leave, which in practice froze up
the labour relationship, or to resign receiving a reduced indemnification of 50%.
The situation created for the Argentine personnel was particularly detrimental,
especially for the ones with many years of service in the companies. The application
of this norm differed between companies and this can easily be explained by its lack of
clarity and manifest legal abuse. The response of the workers to this option was not
uniform; it varied depending upon the source of legal and syndicate advice. Initially,
between 40% and 50% of the personnel accepted to ask for license to continue on the
ships under foreign flag; another 30% to 40% chose to end relations with the
companies, and many of them initiated labour demands for a complete indemnification,
while the remaining 10% asked for leave from the Argentine flag, and did not sign on
again on the ships under the new regime, at least not in the short run. (Figure 6).
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Moreover, the second stage of the deregulation process, with even deeper
consequences, was the decree 817/92 on port and maritime deregulation. In addition it
modified some central aspects of the legislation applicable to ships flying the national
flag.
Seafarers percentual response to the options in the 
decree 1772/93
Accepted to ask 
for license
50%
Ended relations, 
initiated demands
40%
Asked for license 
of the Arg. flag
10%
Figure 6 source: Centro de Capitanes de ultramar
The deregulation process and subsequent flagging out of the Argentine fleet had two
main effects on the labour market. The first one was the reduction of the fleet, and its
consequential reduction in the number of jobs. The second one was the loss of the
whole legal framework of the activity, which conveyed detrimental changes in both the
life and labour conditions of seafarers (wages, compensatory leaves, social benefits
and job stability) and particularly important was the inapplicability under the new
deregulated regime of the national pension fund system. In time, these consequences
led to a significant lack of seafarers.
It can easily be implied that the deregulation of the maritime industry had, both for the
unions and its members, consequences that in every case were extremely negative. As
became evident later, the flagging out of the Argentine fleet brought about a level of
precarisation and instability in the crews’ working conditions never known before.
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Moreover, the changes took place so fast that seafarers could hardly believe what was
happening and adapting to the new life and labour conditions was almost impossible in
such a short period.
The main consequences of the “temporary ceasing of flag” approved by the Decree
1772/91, can be indicated as follows.
· As was mentioned in chapter 1, the decree 1772 / 91, enabled the temporary
flagging out of the Argentine fleet to flags of convenience, while maintaining the
privileges of national ships. However, in actual terms there was no such “temporary
cease of flag”, because it became permanent. Nevertheless, the benefits of being an
Argentine ship were still granted for the shipowner. Therefore, under the cover of a
“temporary cease of flag” shipping companies got the best of both worlds, the benefits
of the Argentine flag, without the obligations. In contrast, none of those benefits, nor
any others, were transferred or granted to the crews that had to work under the strict
conditions of the flag of the ship (usually Panama or Liberia). The flagging out of the
ships from the national register was indeed the main cause for all the following
derived problems.
 
· Loss of a great number of jobs due to the reduction of the fleet and to the reduction
in crew number, consequently increased the unemployment.( Figure 7)
 Both reductions in units and jobs were consequences of the flagging out of the ships to
flags of convenience. Under the new flags, the applicable law was the law of the flag
state; therefore, the companies were allowed to reduce the size of their crews, which
they did immediately, as this feature was one of the most awaited cost reduction
factors. On the other hand, the reduction in the number of units was a consequence of
the banning of national support and the wild competition among companies.
 
 The hypotheses sustained by the government was that a totally deregulated market would
encourage competitiveness and, therefore, a healthier, stronger and open shipping
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market would arise. However, reality proved the hypotheses to be an
oversimplification of a much more complicated issue. The real development was that
once the market was deregulated, the bigger companies took over the smaller ones, as
in a highly competitive market without any regulation is like the law of the jungle, only
the fittest can survive.
 
 The deregulation overnight without any norm replacing the former, far from creating a
highly competitive market dramatically reduced the number of players, as is shown in
Figure 3 (Chapter 1) and Figure 7. This created a situation of a natural oligopoly
where the small players were not able to survive, while the big ones were restructured
reducing the number of players to a very small number. In some cases the bigger
players bought the small companies just to avoid competition, and very soon after they
sold out the units to foreign companies. This fact shows in a simple way the
developments taking place. The outcome of this was that the unemployment grew very
quickly among Argentine crews, and became the biggest problem the seafarers had to
face in the first part of the deregulation process.
 
 The unemployment grew sharply from the end of 1991 till the end of 1992. From that
moment on, it tended to stabilise between 30% and 40%, depending upon the
considered seafarer category. These levels of unemployment started to slowly
decrease with certain variations according to the professional rank, by the end of
1994. This last development was a result of a strong expansion in the industrial fishing
activities, which in 1992 recruited a big quantity of the personnel formerly working in
merchant ships. Since the beginning of 1996 till the end of 1998 the level of
unemployment stayed at manageable levels of 12% to 17%, which are the current
levels of unemployment. However, the situation is still unstable and there is no
possibility to reasonably cope with a new unemployment crisis, especially considering
the general employment situation in Argentina.
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 It is very interesting to see the correlation between the evolution of the number of units
and the unemployment rate (Figure 7). Considering 1991 as the starting point, as can
be seen, the unemployment was very low and the number of units although decreasing,
still considerable. The tendency for both in 1992 was very logical, with a decrease in
the number of units, the unemployment increased. From 1992 to 1993 the trend was the
same but much softened which was already rather curious. However, in 1994
something unexpected happened. Both tendencies jointly started to decrease and from
that point on, they went hand in hand all the way. This outcome was extremely curious
and defies any logic; therefore, it requires further analysis and explanation. The
reasonable thing to expect, would have been with a decreasing number of units an
increasing unemployment rate. However, the outcome was completely different, in the
first place due to alternative sources of employment, mainly industrial fishing, which
by that time was seen more and more as an alternative to the merchant marine and was
promoted by some unions. On the other hand, a great number of seafarers due to the
deregulation developments decided to retire, quit, or start other related or non-related
activities. Therefore, the seafarers demonstrated a great capacity to individually react
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to the deregulation threats. This line of thought is thoroughly explained later in this
chapter in the “sandwich pattern”.
 
 In conclusion, together with the reduction of the job market there was a reduction of the
seafarer market, thereby balancing supply and demand. However, the real problem
was only starting as, once the decline starts, it is very difficult to stop unless the
offered labour conditions change, which is not very likely to happen. At the moment
the seafarers’ market is very unstable on both sides, which only adds to the
willingness of seafarers to quit the activity.
 
· Loss of a substantial part of the seafarers’ wages.
 In a shipowners’ market, like the one that developed after the deregulation, it was no
surprise that the seafarers’ wages were significantly reduced. Moreover, reduction in
crew costs was one of the primary objectives of the deregulation pushed forward by
the shipping companies as they accounted for up to 50% of the fixed costs. However,
the main reductions were not actually in the wages, which were more or less
maintained, but in compensatory leave and other fringe benefits.
 
 This latter development had its reason in the fact that due to the convertibility plan, the
standard of living was by that time considerably high in Argentina. Therefore, a big
reduction in the wages would have pushed the seafarers out of the business. Hence, the
idea was to reduce the wages in a concealed way to avoid a negative mass reaction on
the part of the seafarers, at least in the short run. Nevertheless, the reduction turned out
to be more than significant, in the order of 40% in relation to compensatory leave plus
social benefits.
 
· Loss of the legal and social benefits granted under the labour legislation of the
Argentine flag.
 Due to the flagging out of the Argentine fleet, all the applicable legislation related to legal
labour rights and social security became inapplicable overnight, thus creating a big
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legal vacuum which was not filled by the laws of the new flags. Therefore, the
Argentine crews were faced with a problem, which was out of their hands to solve.
This fact clearly showed that all the following problems had a common origin, which
was the flagging out of the fleet.
 
 The main consequences of loosing the legal framework were: 1) Loss of the priority to
sign on, based on the Argentine nationality, 2) loss of stability in the jobs on board,
and 3) the loss of the social rights These three consequences were the main concern
for seafarers who regarded them as a great threat to their working stability and their
lives.
 
 It can be said that with the disappearance of the legal framework, the seafarer’s jobs
were more a matter of good will on the part of the owners than of any right
whatsoever. It is important to understand the enormous economic, labour, and
psychological impact on the seafarers who felt defenceless in an hostile environment
with a series of developments that would change their lives forever, without any say
on them at all. Once again, the willingness to quit the activity prevailed among
seafarers as it seemed the only possible way out.
 
· In many cases, seafarers were excluded from the national social security system.
This feature is unique within the Argentine context, and it was the result of an unwise
and badly implemented policy. The decree 1772 / 91, while enabling the flagging out
of the Argentine fleet, did not consider the minimum rights of the national crews,
which were simply ignored.
 The outcome of this lack of consideration was an exclusion of all the seamen engaged in
Argentine outflagged ships from the national social security and pension system. In
fact, according to the Argentine law, people working outside the country are not
entitled to the benefits of social security. Therefore, working on board a vessel flying
a foreign flag is legally working outside the country; there are no taxes to pay, and no
social security or other side benefits granted, not even access to the national pension
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fund system. It was, therefore, evident that the seafarers’ interests were not taken into
consideration in the least. What may be even more significant is the fact that until
today, eight years later, the matter is not yet solved and it does not look like it will be
solved in the near future in spite of the constant unions’ claims.
 
 Finally, it is interesting to see what is the reason for such a lack of diligence, unless it is
not actually a lack of diligence but part of a total policy against the crews. The lack of
action on the part of the government regarding the seafarers’ situation on social
benefits and especially the proper access to pension funds is not understandable.
Access to those rights is basic and should be granted to all citizens, no matter their
profession. It is an unavoidable obligation on the governmental authorities and a matter
of equality before the law, and it will surely be a source of disputes and suits against
the state once the political situation changes.
 
· Loss of the benefits granted by the collective agreements as a result of their
 inapplicability under the new regime.
 Under the new flag regime, collective labour agreements and acts became obsolete,
thus, all the labour framework and benefits vanished overnight for Argentine crews.
The new deregulation regime abolished the whole legal framework ruling the activity
up to that time without replacing it or setting the grounds for future agreements. The
main consequences for the seafarers was that they lost their terms of reference
regarding wages, working hours, over-time, hierarchical responsibility, compensatory
leave and all other benefits or agreements. Hence the reference baseline for
negotiations and for accomplishing tasks on board was inexistent, which created a
great vacuum and a lot of confusion. The crew on board the vessels were subject to the
labour law of the flag state, which in practice meant that all the working conditions
were imposed by the company. Any consideration for the seafarers was dependent
upon the good will of the employer, which created big differences between companies.
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 As was mentioned before, most of the consequences of the Decree 817/92, “Port and
maritime deregulation”, were in fact very similar to those of the Decree 1772/91
However, the main difference resides in the fact that while the latter refers to
outflagged ships, the former refers to ships flying the national flag. Extending its
consequences to the ships in the national register was more grave and of a greater
significance for the industry as a whole, and for the seafarers in particular.
 
 Moreover, it clearly demonstrated that the only goal was to deregulate rather than to
reverse the declining of the fleet, which was the main reason for the whole process.
Beside the implications derived from the inapplicability of the collective labour
agreements, the elimination of the nationality clause had serious consequences for the
ships flying the Argentine flag, especially for the fishing vessels. It was only after a
serious conflict between the Captain’s Centre and Y.P.F that it was resolved that at
least the Captain should hold Argentinean nationality.
 
 The main consequences for the crews of the Decree 817/92, “Port and maritime
deregulation” can be indicated as follows:
 
 
 
· Elimination of the priority to sign on in Argentine ships based on nationality.
 As seen in Chapter 1, Decree 817/92 enabled foreign seafarers without residence in the
country to sign on in Argentine Merchant ships. Furthermore, it allowed an
interpretation to avoid Art. 112 of the Law of navigation, to enable non-citizens to be
employed as Masters or officers. This issue was hitting directly into the heart of the
national crews, because the exemption was being done on vessels flying the Argentine
flag, not on outflagged ships. In practical terms it did not have any real consequences
in the merchant marine because the shipping companies wanted to maintain the
Argentine crews. However, it did have effects on fishing vessels, which were foreign
property and were able to incorporate a percentage of foreign seafarers. In conclusion,
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in practical terms the consequences were the loss of some jobs due to the inclusion of
foreign crew members and the potential threat of replacement of the national crews,
thus, another negotiation tool for the shipping companies.
 
· Elimination of the rights of professional associations of seamen, to discuss the crew
number for commercial exploitation of the ships.
 One of the former rights of the unions was to discuss with the owners the number of
crew members on board the different ships for commercial exploitation. It was
implied that the total number would never be less than the minimum safety
requirements. However, the final number was a matter to be negotiated between the
parties. With the elimination of this right, the unions lost the possibility to negotiate a
greater number of jobs for their members. This issue, of course, contributed to the
unemployment and the weakening position of seafarers and unions.
 
· Flexibilisation of the requisites for the validation of foreign permits, to sign on
national flag ships.
 This feature is no more than an enlargement of the policy of allowing foreign crews, as a
method of facilitating the procedure. In actual terms, this feature enabled the use of
foreign crew in ships flying the Argentine flag, which greatly increased the pressure on
Argentine crews, which until that moment were concerned about the jobs in outflagged
ships. The immediate consequence for the seafarers was that the threat of replacement
by foreign crews became even more concrete. Therefore, jobs were even more
unstable than before, while at the same time the negotiating position of the Argentine
crews was weakened even more.
 
 In summary, as a consequence of the deregulation policies, more than sixty collective
agreements related to port and maritime activities were suspended. All the labour
collective agreements in port, maritime, and fishing activities were suspended. The
Labour Law became the ceiling of the labour rights of the workers, instead of the floor.
Furthermore, the decree 1264 / 92 suspended all collective agreements and acts not
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specified in Annex III of decree 817 / 92, leaving the unions without a reference about
their members’ rights and drawing all negotiations between unions and owners back to
zero.
 
 The above mentioned deregulation norms were complemented and incremented by
means of a chartering regime by which foreign vessels were granted national treatment
regarding cabotage commerce, while the crews were subject to the law of the vessel’s
flag.
 
 To conclude, the deregulation process of the activity, did not in any way bring about
development, nor modernisation of the merchant marine. Regarding the personnel, the
complete flexibilisation of their labour conditions simply meant an income transfer
from the labour sector to the companies. In addition, such deregulation did not mean
the creation of new jobs. On the contrary, jobs were greatly reduced in number, while
the life and labour conditions of seafarers were drastically worsened. Nevertheless,
the real achievement was a great reduction of the crew costs and the privatisation of
the ports.
 3.2 The actual lack of seafarers and its future consequences
 
 One of the most notorious and unexpected effects of the deregulation process has been
the increasing lack of seafarers, especially officers. Although an international
problem, the shortage of officers had never been a problem in Argentina until the
deregulation process came about. In fact, the officer population was quite sufficient in
number to man the national ships, and it was very seldom that any problem would arise
in that respect. Moreover, the National Nautical School used to have a big number of
candidates every year from which to make a good selection. Therefore, the quality and
training of the Argentine officers has been long recognised at a national and
international level.
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 However, from 1991 on, things started to change, due to the deregulation decrees
previously mentioned, which brought about deleterious consequences for the seafarers.
Among other consequences, there were loss of jobs due to reduction of the fleet and
reduction of the number of crew members, wage reductions, especially the banning of
social and labour benefits, and the lack of labour stability, which among other factors
contributed to the decision of seafarers to quit the activity.
 
 The process, which the seafarers went through after the deregulation process, has been
very interesting to follow, while at the same time it mirrors similar processes in the
world, especially in Western Europe. It is important to note that after the convertibility
law, (explained in Chapter), the Argentine Peso was put on parity, one to one, with the
US dollar. Therefore, the cost of life in Argentina quickly reached the levels of any
developed country (Figure 8), becoming as expensive as Sweden or France, for
instance, while at the same time, the wages, labour stability, and all other benefits in
the maritime industry were being reduced or banned altogether due to the outflagging.
 Thus, a big gap was opening between the crew expectations and what was being
actually offered. The fact that seafarers in Argentina had historically been well
remunerated only added to the problem. It is, therefore, interesting to look at the
evolution of the consumer price index to understand the developments regarding the
living costs in Argentina.
 
 In Figure 8, the consumer price index for the period 1989-1998 is given. The trend of
the index shows that the cumulative index grew steadily until 1991, the year in which
the Convertibility Law was promulgated. However, the increasing index reflected the
great inflation but the increase of prices only covered the real value of the goods and
services. From that point on, the index started to stabilise until 1994, the year in which
it definitely stabilised.
 
 The fact that the index finally stabilised, only reflects the effect of the convertibility on
the consumer prices. Nevertheless, although with a very low gradient , there still is a
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tendency towards increase, which is a big problem because it increases the prices at
constant currency. However, once the stability was reached, the prices were so high
that Argentina was by then, a very expensive country. Therefore, the Argentine crews
became very expensive as well.
 
 However, the manpower shortage was not immediately noticeable. Instead, at the very
beginning shipowners felt they had the absolute control of the situation. Indeed, they
did have control at that time, because the whole deregulation process was so abrupt
that nobody had time to react to the changes immediately. Therefore, the population of
seafarers as a whole was forced to accept the new labour conditions under the new
flag regime.
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 However, this situation was not meant to last. In a short period of time, an unexpected
pattern started to develop within the seafarers’ market; a pattern which may be called
“the sandwich pattern”.
 
 The “sandwich pattern” explains to a great extent the developments in Figure 7, which
defies any logic. Certainly, a reduction in the number of jobs it is not likely to cause a
balance of the supply and demand of seafarers. Nevertheless, that was the outcome.
Logic would have indicated that the unemployment rate would increase in an inverse
proportion to the decrease in the jobs. However, what really happened was that many
seafarers suddenly left the market, compensating the lack of jobs.
 
 It is clear that from all the above mentioned facts the goal of each and every seafarer
was to quit, to retire, or start a different activity, as this was the one and only handy
solution to the problems arising in their works. However, the draining of seafarers
from the market took a very singular form.
 “The Sandwich Pattern”
 
 Top Layer                                                                            Senior officers and  ratings
 
 Middle Layer                Experienced officers and ratings in the middle of their careers
 
 Lower Layer                                        Officers in training,  junior officers and  ratings
 Figure.9
 
 
 The “sandwich pattern” considers the total population of seafarers distributed in three
different layers one on top of the other (that is the reason for the name). The top layer
consists of senior officers or ratings, meaning experienced professionals on the top of
their careers. This part of the population consists of people who are totally or partially
fulfilling the conditions for retirement. Thus, the behaviour of this layer would be very
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clear, they would retire right away if possible, or stay to complete the required
conditions for retirement. It is evident that this layer is the one which is in a better
position to retire from the work, while at the same time it is the most difficult to
replace in the short run. Therefore, in spire of the diminishing number of units the
massive retirement of this layer would tend to compensate the difference.
 The officers in training and junior officers or ratings would constitute the lower layer.
This part of the population has usually no or less obligations, family, or commercial
constraints that would tie them to their work. Thus, due to the extremely adverse
conditions for finding a ship, getting a job, the low wages and poor social and labour
conditions would probably make this part of the seafarers population quit after a while
and direct their efforts to studying or getting experience in a related or different field.
Therefore, whichever the case, they would soon be out of the market, hence, in this
layer the proportion of seafarers leaving the maritime field would surely be very high,
which would as well contribute to even the difference with the decreasing number of
vessels.
 
 Finally, experienced officers and ratings in the middle of their active careers would
constitute the middle layer. This part of the population would find themselves  trapped
in the system without the immediate possibility of quitting or directing their efforts into
different works. In fact, the responsibilities assumed in their lives such as families,
house mortgages and other obligations would prevent them from leaving seafaring right
away, at least in the short run.
 
 This layer was the one that mislead the shipowners, making them think that everything
was under control. Nevertheless, the demotivation factor would be a very important
factor and it will eventually show in their work and performance. Even though their
personal obligations would prevent them from quitting right away, it will undoubtedly
be in their minds, and they would do so on the first opportunity they have, although the
draining would be very slow but constant.
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 The later developments in this aspect, showed during 1998 that it was impossible to
cover all the requirements of the market. However, the lack of seafarers, although
generalised, is more notorious in certain companies which had developed a bad
reputation among seafarers in the years following the deregulation process. This fact
shows that there is a niche in the seafarers’ market of people whose personal
obligations allowed them to choose which employments to take. All the above
mentioned facts indicate that the trend is to a continuous shrinkage of the seafarers
market, which is already creating and in time will create an even more important
problem for the companies to face.
 
 After the deregulation process, the shipowners had the unique opportunity of gathering
the best-qualified crews ever. In fact, due to the reduction in crew number there was a
lack of jobs for officers and ratings and a desperate need for work. However, instead
of making the most from this opportunity, shipowners were not up to the circumstances,
and preferred to take revenge on seafarers for past differences. A policy was
implemented which included black lists, interchange of information about seafarers
suing companies, and the setting up of a network for avoiding employment of certain
people for different reasons, including health problems.
 
 The immediate outcome of this policy was that seafarers felt totally insecure in their
jobs, not to mention the fact that many officers were fired without any understandable
reason. This environment created a hopeless feeling that no security was available and
that the only reasonable thing to do was to leave in order to start something new. All
these facts contributed to a constant draining of officers towards other related or non-
related activities, in order to escape from the witch hunting. Besides, one of the main
factors that actively contributed to this draining, was the suspension of the social and
pension benefits for seafarers engaged in outflagged vessels. In fact, this issue is still
questioned without any satisfactory response.
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 One very curious feature of the process was the disregard and carelessness of the
employers towards their employees. In fact, most of the shipping companies adopted
the policy of not carrying officers in training, considering it a waste of money. This
policy is hard to understand, because training officers is not only in the seafarers
interest, but to the companies’ benefit as well, in order to have a constant supply of
officers to cope with replacements and new demand. Nevertheless, this latter fact was
systematically disregarded as if the supply of officers was everlasting. As a matter of
fact, it was not, and this policy accelerated the shortage of officers, specially junior
ones.
 
 In summary, a badly conceived cost-cutting policy actually accelerated an incipient
problem reducing the time of occurrence and increasing its effects leading the way to a
reduced seafarers’ market, which is already a big concern and one of the biggest
problems the industry will face in the near future. Besides, the increasing lack of
seafarers, especially officers, has been helped by the labour insecurity, the lack of
protective regulations, and non-applicability of social securities under the new flag
regime. Therefore, the shortage of seafarers will undoubtedly affect many areas of the
industry, especially the needs of the shore-based sector.
 
 The increasing shortage of the seafarer population may have a deep impact on shore
based sectors of the Argentine maritime industry, especially in all sectors of the
industry that rely upon expertise derived from seafaring careers. The shore based
maritime business, technical ship operating companies, classification societies,
insurance, ports and government inspection services, will all need to address this
problem urgently. Moreover, being a successful marine/maritime nation depends upon
the people the industry employs as well as their skills and experience.
 
 The last decade has seen a dramatic decline in the number of vacancies on cargo ships.
So what about the future now that the once abundant supply of trained ship officers has
been dramatically reduced and is still decreasing ? There are a number of questions to
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be answered related to the future. How will the ships be manned in the future if the
know-how is vanishing and where will tomorrow’s maritime employees originate
from ? How will they gain practical industry experience ?
 Moreover, a big dilemma will be presented to the Argentine shipping companies in the
near future. How will the industry cope with the lack of experienced senior officers to
cover positions on board if there is no availability? The answer of the Argentine
companies was that they would use foreign officers as the rest of the industry. The next
question was, whether they were going to copy the solutions of the industry. If so, they
would inevitably face the same problems. Therefore, how will they cope with the lack
of experienced officers to cover the managerial positions usually covered by former
captains or chief engineers ? Are they willing to include foreign personnel as
managers within their companies?
 
 The answer to the latter question was a deep silence. Once more the industry is being
reactive and not proactive and will undoubtedly face their postponed debts. The same
issues were risen with different first quality companies during field trips to Greece,
Denmark, and London, and no absolute answer was given. When directly enquired
about that latter fact, they answered that they were talking about it, which in actual
facts mean they have done nothing so far. The most peculiar answer was given by a
Greek shipowner who said “ the industry will find a way”.
 
 Therefore, the attitude of talking about it but still doing nothing seems to be not only
national but international. The problem is not an easy one, and to solve it, it is
necessary to join efforts. People that may contribute to solving this problem range from
universities, academies, college staff, personnel managers, employers in the maritime
industry in general, as well as managers depending upon maritime expertise.
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 3.3 The consequences for the Unions and their work
 
 During the times of high inflation rates, the hyperinflation and subsequent deregulation
process (78-91), the relationship between the unions and shipowners was rather
difficult. The reason for these difficulties was the fact that the constantly increasing
inflation rate led to a constant devaluation of the currency and, therefore, a steady loss
in the purchasing power of the seafarers’ salaries. Thus, the constant claiming of the
unions for compensating the losses in value of the salaries became chronic. Moreover,
it became a great source of discussion and misunderstanding between the two parties.
 Although the unions were asking for maintaining the purchasing power of the salaries,
this constant claim was regarded by the companies as abusive. Moreover, shipping
companies claimed that the increasing crew costs were turning the activity
unprofitable. On the other hand, some unions used to abuse their power, specially
when negotiating benefits. These facts made the companies eager for a deregulation
scheme in order to get rid of the unions’ pressure. As become evident later, the
flagging out of the Argentine fleet brought about for the Argentine crews a level of
uncertainty and insecurity in their working conditions never known before.
 
 At the time of the deregulation process, all the analyses made by the unions concluded
that in such a context it was not possible to stop the application of the deregulation
norms, not even by adopting extreme industrial measures. Therefore, the unions
decided to try the signing of working agreements for application under the new flags of
the ships, even though there was no norm in place to persuade the shipping companies
to negotiate such agreements.
 
 Therefore, in most of the cases, the negotiations were very difficult or impossible. The
main difficulty was the lack of interest of the companies in the negotiations, which was
a very logical outcome, as they had nothing to win.
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 In spite of those difficulties, the unions’ perseverance was directed to the
establishment in each company of common minimum working conditions, in the
conviction that it would benefit the stability of the jobs. It is important to note that in
many of the negotiated agreements it was possible to maintain and sometimes even
increase, the net incomes of the officers, while reducing the total cost of personnel.
Thus, it became evident that the main cause for the extra costs of the crews were the
social costs.
 
 
· The sudden change in the legislation, produced a logical weakening of the unions’
 position.
 Indeed, the impossibility to put some kind of limit on the abuse and evident lack of legality
in the execution of the deregulation process on part of the government contributed to
the weakening of the unions in the eyes of their members. The fear of loosing jobs, in a
context of shrinkage of the activity, acted over the seafarers as a strong brake against
any individual or collective intentions to stop or at least modify the deregulation
scheme In conclusion, the unions were really constrained in their acting capacity.
 
 Although the perception of the members was a lack of action on part of the unions, as the
deregulation was a political decision, there was no other way to react but through
justice. In any case there was not much chance, since the Supreme Court was totally
biased to the government. Most of the consequences affecting the unions had the same
origin as the ones affecting the seafarers as such; therefore, they share many of their
features. However, the main difference resides in the way in which they were affected.
 
· The loss of the benefits granted by the collective agreements as a result of their
inapplicability under the new regime.
 
 As seen in chapter 1, the decrees 1772 / 91, 817 / 92 and 1264 / 92 suspended all the
collective labour agreements in all maritime related activities, which enabled the
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shipping companies to avoid negotiations with the unions altogether, imposing their
own conditions in the market regardless of any former negotiation or agreement
whatsoever.
 
 These three decrees can be considered a trilogy enlarging and complementing each other.
As a result of them, more than sixty collective agreements related to port and maritime
activities were repealed. Thus, the main consequence for the unions was the loss of all
the established framework agreements with the companies, which meant that all
negotiations between owners and unions were drawn back to zero. There were no
more legal obligations between them and the unions were left without tools. This fact
also had a considerable impact on the unions’ influence in labour negotiations, as they
no longer had a decisive role, loosing strength and lobbying capacity.
 
 This was very detrimental to the unions as they lost protagonism and their members lost
confidence in their unions’ capacity to properly represent their interests. Furthermore,
the affiliation rate decreased dramatically in some unions when the respective
members perceived that no immediate improvements were to be obtained.
 
· Elimination of the right of professional associations of seamen to discuss the crew
number for commercial exploitation of the ships while enabling foreign seafarers
without residence in the country to sign on Argentine Merchant ships.
 
 This feature is almost unique because practically all legislations, except flags of
convenience, require at least the master to be of the nationality of the flag. However,
this feature went one step further towards the weakening of the unions in their
negotiation and representative capacity, eliminating as many requirements as possible
to make Argentine crews dispensable. The consequences were such that in practical
terms, Argentine companies were able, according to the law, to man their ships
without any intervention of the unions whatsoever. However, this was not the case as
they continued using national crews, but the unions’ capacity to negotiate or to obtain
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benefits was not there any more. According to the data provided by the unions, foreign
seafarers (not resident in the country) sailing in Argentine vessels, did not in any case
surpass the 5% of the total. The fact that, the number of foreign seafarers had not
increased even in ships flying flags of convenience or with Argentine flag treatment, is
due to two main facts. The first one, has to do with the high professional qualifications
of the Argentine crews, which has been widely recognised by the Argentine
shipowners themselves. The second fact, is related to the effect the numerous working
agreements promoted and signed by the unions during the deregulation and outflagging
process with the operators remaining in the national flag.
 
· Elimination of the priority to sign on ships flying the Argentine flag for national
crews.
 The effects of the elimination of the priority to sign on based on nationality on the unions,
were indeed very similar to the effects mentioned before regarding seafarers.
However, the direct outcome was that the unions were heartily weakened in their
bargaining power with the owners. Although, the legal framework and collective
agreements theoretically still applied under Argentine flag, the fact that Argentine
crews could be replaced by foreign crews was a bargaining tool in the hands of the
owners to drive negotiations in their own benefit by having the unions under the threat
of changing crew, and knowing that once the change is done, it is likely to be
permanent. During the first part of the deregulation process this fact was of paramount
importance because it conferred the total bargaining power to the shipping companies,
which were actually imposing conditions rather than negotiating.
 
· Flexibilisation of the requisites for the validation of foreign permits to sign on
national ships.
 The Decree 817/92 enabled foreign seafarers without residence in the country to sign on
Argentine Merchant ships. The direct outcome of this was that the unions were
weakened in their negotiation power with the owners. Moreover, the flexibilisation of
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the requisites was a facilitation of the final purpose of either replacing the crews or
imposing the companies conditions on the unions.
 
 
· Economic imbalance of the unions due to job reductions.
 One of the main consequences of the implementation of the deregulation policy was
indeed the reduction in the number of jobs on board. All of a sudden, the main funding
source of the unions, the members’ percentile contributions from their wages, were
dramatically reduced along with the number of employments. Therefore, the income
level of the unions followed a pattern mirroring the level of employment of the
members. According to the data provided by the unions,
 
Years Total number of employments Reduct %
1/1/91 5424 X
31/12/98 1314 24,2
Difference 4110 75,8
 Table3  Source: Centro de Capitanes de Ultramar (approx. values)
 Period (91-98) In the calculation, the effects of the diminished leave regime
 were weighted
 
 This development was very detrimental for the unions because it threatened their own
existence. In addition, their financial and operative capabilities were tremendously
reduced. As can be understood, this feature is not a minor one, but at the very
beginning required from the unions serious adjustments to the new conditions, and the
capacity of the unions was so affected that some of them are still recovering.
According to the data provided by the unions, the income reduction due to the
deregulation process and its consequences, was about 70% for the rating unions, and
60% for the officers unions, considering the period from 1/1791 to 31/12/98.
 
· Fluctuation of the affiliation rates in the different unions.
 In this sense, a significant difference in the level of the affiliation maintenance rates
between unions gathering officers of different specialisation and ratings can be
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observed (Table 3). While the officers’ unions retained the traditional massive level
of affiliation, the rating unions lost many members. In this last case, the great number
of activities represented by only one organisation, as well as the perception that no
results were to be expected from the union, were the most decisive factors. On the
other hand, the unions representing the officers did not suffer as much due to the
awareness in that sector that the best possible defence was to maintain the unity
awaiting a change in the political conditions.
 
 The unions’ activities had after some time tended to achieve stabilisation. However,
they were not able to recover the level of participation, political influence and
lobbying capacity they used to have before the deregulation process. From the above
mentioned facts, it can be inferred that in addition to all the prejudices already
mentioned, an increasing fear of loosing their jobs was generated among seafarers. In
that scenario, the perception that a joint defence of their labour interests through the
union organisations may, at least, attenuate the damage to their interests or provide for
a better defence, started to break down. In those circumstances, the relative weakness
of the unions and seafarers was deepened even more.
 
Union Affiliation Level
Before deregulation After deregulation
Ratings 95% 60%
Officers 98% 97%
 Table4  Source: Centro de Capitanes de Ultramar (approx. values)
 Period (91-98)
 
 It can also be added, that a substantial number of ships did not change flags
immediately for different reasons. Among them, the still important national fleets of
ELMA and YPF, as well as other privately-owned units, maintained the national flag
for some time. In those cases, the labour cost reduction was promoted via negotiation
of new labour agreements, similar to the ones signed for the foreign flags. It also
proved that if there had been negotiation will on unions and shipowners, it would have
been possible to reach solutions different to the ones finally adopted. However, this
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last reflection can only be made in the light of the results, as at the time of negotiation
there was no will whatsoever to concede anything among the parties, which made any
kind of agreement virtually impossible.
 
In summary, the consequences and implications of the deregulation process for the
unions are very much tied to the consequences and implications for the seafarers.
Furthermore, it is not possible to talk about one without mentioning the other.
Nevertheless, the consequences for the unions can be divided into economical
consequences due to the reduction of jobs, and political consequences due to the
change in legislation and the loss of lobbying capacity and political influence.
Finally, undermining the members’ trust in their own representative institutions can be
regarded as the worst of them all. Although this fact varied depending upon each
institution, the result was that the unions as institutions were discredited and regarded
as incapable of reverting a deleterious situation This last fact was the main reason for
members to leave their unions. Moreover, it was the main strategy against the unions
and their work, in order to weaken their position as far as possible and towards their
possible disintegration.
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Chapter 4
The consequences and implications for Shipowners and their business
4.1 The lobby for deregulation of the shipping business
In the deregulatory environment created by the Law for the “Reform of the State”
(1989), and the “Economic Emergency” law (1989), which became the tools for the
structural reform of the State, shipowners found their long awaited opportunity to
obtain the deregulation of the Argentine Merchant Marine in order to reduce their
costs. Manning costs in particular have long been an obsession for Argentine
shipowners, because they accounted for up to 50% of the running costs. Therefore,
some of the more conspicuous shipping companies began to lobby at political levels in
order to achieve the deregulation of the activity. Although unions were aware of this
fact, at that moment they lacked the required lobbying capacity at the governmental
level, to counteract the shipowners actions. Moreover, the shipowners’ lobby for
deregulation had the great advantage of  being in line with the governmental policies of
the time. Thus, the Decree 1772/91 of September 1991, was the end of a strong
offensive, initiated by the shipowners, towards the deregulation of the shipping
business in the search for improving their competitiveness through cost-reductions.
The profitability of the shipping companies had been largely affected by the
implementation of economic policies tending to control the high levels of inflation, all
of them implemented to restrict the flotation of the US dollar value in the market. Until
the convertibility law was adopted, shipping companies were making profits out of
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financial speculation rather than from the shipping business itself. However, after the
convertibility law was in place, it was clear for the Argentine shipowners that it was
not possible any more to improve their competitiveness via currency devaluation.
As a result of the convertibility law, the internal costs in Argentina greatly increased,
which gradually made it evident that the operative and administrative structure of the
shipping companies, were both oversized and extremely expensive, therefore, not
competitive. Regarding the seafarers, their cost was indeed higher than that of other
nationalities, however, this was mainly due to the effect of the social costs on their
remuneration. The main argument of the shipowners to explain the crisis of the activity,
and to justify the need for its total deregulation was the high incidence of crew labour
costs. In fact, in the Decree 1772/91, out of its 15 articles, 6 are related to crew
matters (arts.7,8,9,10,12 and 13), showing the importance granted by shipping
companies to crew costs.
One specially controversial issue was the compensatory leave regime for seafarers,
whose coefficients had progressively increased (42% of the time at sea for general
cargo and bulk, and 52% for tankers) due to the negotiations with the unions
(agreement acts), in replacement of wages increases, which should have been granted
to compensate the loss in purchasing power of the local currency due to inflation. This
negotiation scheme tended to be favoured by the unions, due to the fact, that it was the
only way to increase the existing number of jobs in a stagnated market. (Castro 1998).
It is important to note that from the middle eighties the merchant fleet tended to
decrease in number of units, and increase in age (table 1, figures 3 and 4). Moreover,
lack of maintenance of the fleet increased its obsolescence. This was an old fact,
which started in the seventies with the Decree 52/ 70, which made the former Decree
480/ 68 even more comprehensive, granting entrance into the National Flag of even
older units (some of them almost obsolete). This followed an inverse path to the one
followed, not only by the traditional Maritime Countries, but by many developing
countries as well.
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In fact, at a press conference held on the 18th of November 1970 at the Captains and
officers Centre of the Merchant Marine, under the topic “ The Merchant Marine and its
problems” the Secretary General, highlighting the influence of the implementation of
wrong policies and their possible consequences, expressed “While all the traditional
Maritime Countries and some developing countries are engaged in a race for
modernisation and development of their Merchant Fleets and Naval industries,
enlarging their fleets with modern units, many of them made in their own shipyards, we
pretend to achieve the same results with old ships, most of them almost obsolete, and
only for the sake of a momentary and badly understood economic benefit; specially for
the subsidiaries of foreign companies. Perhaps, following this path the Argentine Flag
will eventually become a flag of convenience”.
As an additional argument, shipowners raised the point that the medical costs for
diseases and accidents of the crews were too heavy a burden to support. Even though,
in these aspects, there were indeed questionable behaviours within the Argentine
crews, the shipowners themselves were in many cases responsible for not establishing
clear guidelines for personnel conduct and for yielding very quickly to certain union
pressures. Besides, most of the time, benefits were granted without any obligation or
compromise on the other party, being a win-loose negotiating situation.
A clear example of the latter fact, was when the Shipowners’ Maritime Centre granted
to most of the unions an important wage increase as well as other improvements in
working conditions in July 1989. A few months back, they had negotiated with the
Captain’s Centre a similar benefit scheme, which required full time work on part of
the officers. However, this time no obligations were required in exchange for the
benefits.
It is easy to assume, that this careless attitude on the part of the shipowners, and
pressing attitudes on the part of the unions, generated serious distortions in
remuneration, (such as the Captain’s wages being the third/fourth salary on the ship)
and, therefore, uneasiness and claims to the companies generating a vicious cycle.
Besides, it can be said that a historical opportunity was lost to improve the
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organisation of the work on board of the ships, as well as to establish a fair and
reasonable rewarding system, capable of assuring the maintenance of the relation
between wage scales, and establishing fixed parameters for the calculation of crew
costs.
To conclude, both the unions and shipowners were at fault in their behaviours, but the
political conditions at the time were in favour of the shipping companies. Therefore,
the shipowners saw the opportunity to end with a situation that would no longer be
sustainable due to the new economic conditions of the country. Furthermore,
shipowners thought that a well done lobbying would enable them to recover the
competitiveness they used to have under the currency devaluation scheme. Hence they
devoted all their best efforts to obtain the industry deregulation via political lobbying.
The fact that their request was in line with the policies, which the government was
implementing at that moment, was a decisive factor for their success, as the whole
governmental machinery was working in their favour, even the Supreme Court of
Justice.
4.2 Economical and Political consequences of the deregulation process affecting the
Argentine shipowners.
The consequences of the deregulation process for the shipowners can be clearly
divided into two stages, first, the short term consequences, and second, the medium
and long term. In the short run, the deregulation policies implemented were extremely
beneficial for the shipowners because the deregulation process allowed them to
drastically reduce their crew costs, by means of a reduction in the benefits granted to
seafarers and a reduction in the crew number. Moreover, the flagging out of the fleet,
exempted the vessels from national taxes.
Another important feature of the deregulation process was the weakening of the unions.
It relieved the shipping companies from the pressure formerly exercised by the unions
and placed the shipowners in an advantageous position for negotiation or for simply
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imposing conditions in the labour market. Furthermore, the privatisation of the ports
dramatically reduced the fares, while increasing their operativeness and efficiency,
thereby, helping the shipping companies to became more competitive.
However, in the medium and long run, it looked as if the shipowners became victims
of the same system they lobbied for and pushed to implement. Indeed, lateler it was
proved that all that the companies had longed for, was turning against them. For
instance, the obsession for reducing the number of crew and their cost, finally
produced a shortage of seafarers, the consequences of which are yet to be evaluated.
Moreover, it became evident that reducing crew costs was not enough to solve their
problem of competitiveness, which in fact was created by an oversize and inefficiency
of their structures and obsolescence of the fleet, which all became evident after the
convertibility law was in place.
When evaluating the pros and cons of the deregulation measures, it seems that the
shipowners were mislead. They thought that the change in only one variable (crew
costs), would be enough to overcome all their problems. This was, of course, an
oversimplification, as many other variables should have been taken into account. It
looks as if they were so submerged in their own narrow view of the business that they
did not realise there was a hard competitive world out there only awaiting for a
chance to slip into a market which Argentine companies thought their own. Neither did
they realise that the governmental policy towards deregulation was really
comprehensive, thus, the deregulation measures would not only affect the crews but
them as well in such a way, that the shipping business would never be the same as
before.
The main negative consequences for shipping companies in the medium and long run
were:
· The loss of the “Cargo reservation Law”
· The loss of the Merchant Marine fund.
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· The loss of the state support on benefits like bunker discounts and priority for
entering national ports.
· The entrance of foreign competitors, specially global carriers (Maersk line) intothe
market, creating a multiplier effect in it, as other carriers were tempted to enter as
well when they saw a leading carrier in a new market.
As was discussed in chapter 3, a shortage in manpower supply, specially officers, is
one of the biggest problems to solve by national shipowners.
Finally, all the above mentioned facts, lead the way to a scenario where the Argentine
Merchant Marine and, therefore, the shipping business, lost its former economic and
political relevance, the latter being a consequence of the former. For instance, figure
10 displays the net contribution of the national Merchant Marine to the balance of
payments, and shows that the net contribution has been constantly decreasing since
1990, and the trend is to decrease even more. In fact, in 1990 the net contribution was
226,6 millions of dollars, whereas, in 1997 it was only 24,4 million dollars.
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The logical conclusion of the facts in figure 10 is that the Merchant Marine lost
economic importance for the country. As a consequence, politicians regarded the
shipping activity as economically irrelevant for the country and therefore, did not
hesitate to withdraw all support from and care for the activity.
These facts are directily linked to the ones in figure 11, which displays the value of the
freight generated by Argentine ships (including ships with provisonal cessation of flag
decree 1772/91 and chartered by resident shipowners), in relation to the total freight
value generated by all means of transport for the period 1989-1997. When analysing
this figure, is becomes evident that the freight value generated by all means of
transport was been sharply increasing, especially since 1991 (implementation of the
deregulation). However, the freight value earned by Argentine vessels was very small
in comparison, and the trend was to diminish even more. In actual fact, to make it show
in the graph, it has been necessary to divide the total freight value earned by national
ships by ten.
This means that the values are in themselves very small, (not economically relevant),
when compared to the total value. Therefore, from a macroeconomic point of view, the
shipping business is becoming less and less important in its contribution to the
economic activity of the country. All the analysed graphs are showing the same trend,
hence, it is correct to deduct that the activity would become dispensable in the view of
the politicians. Therefore, shipping companies would probably loose even more
economic and political influence, as well as lobbying capacity at the economical,
political and governmental levels.
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Evolution of the total freight value generated by all 
means of transport in relation to the freight value 
generated by Argentine ships ( 89-97 ) 
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Figure 11 Source Indec and Dcion. Nacional de cuentas Internacionales, de la secretaria de
programacion economica, del ministerio de economia y obras publicas.
In 1989 the freight value earned by Argentine vessels was 2,4 % of the total freight
value, whereas, in 1997 it was only 0,07 %, which is very significant, in the sense that
it is almost nothing. Moreover, the graph in figure 11 shows that the gradient of the
curve is definitely decreasing, which means that no recovery is to be expected. On the
contrary, it will get even worse, which means zero. In summary, freights earned by
Argentine ships  are not only decreasing in percentile terms but are disappearing in
absolute terms. In actual fact, this outcome means basically two things for the
shipowners. Firstly, that the Argentine participation in the national shipping business
is shrinking and, therefore, the business is going out of their hands into the hands of
foreign companies. Secondly, the importance (contribution) of the business to the
national economy is dramatically decreasing with the aforementioned consequences.
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Along the same line of thought of the facts already described, figure 12, shows the
distribution of the total value of the freight earned between Argentine and foreign
ships. From the graph it is clear that the freight value earned by Argentine ships has
always been small when compared to the one earned by foreign vessels. However,
since 1991/92 after the deregulation process was implemented, the gradient of the
curve has really sharpened into a dramatic decrease figure 13. In fact, in 1987, the
freight value earned by national ships was 30% of the one earned by foreign vessels,
whereas, in 1991, it represented 12,6%, and in 1997 only 1,1%. Therefore, the
business for the Argentine shipowners (including, ships with provisory suspension of
flag, Decree 1772/91, and chartered by resident shipowners) has been constantly and
rapidly shrinking since the deregulation of the activity.
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Figure  13  freights perceived by Argentine ships (includes, ships with provisory cease of flag,
Decree 1772/91, and chartered by resident shipowners).
Source: Dcion. Nacional de cuentas Internacionales, de la secretaria de programacion economica,
del ministerio de economia y obras publicas.
This decrease has been so sharp due to the facts that the value of the freights earned by
foreign vessels has been increasing steadily, specially since 1992. Thus, even if the
national freight value would have remained constant in absolute terms, it would have
decreased in relative terms. In order to maintain its percentage share it would have
needed to grow at least at the same rate as the foreign freight value. Instead, it has been
constantly decreasing in absolute terms, especially since 1991, which created a double
decreasing effect, one being absolute and the other relative This means that the real
shipping business has mostly been in the hands of foreign ships, nevertheless, in the
period after the deregulation, the Argentine participation has been reduced to almost
anecdotic values. This latter fact may very well indicate the near end of the Merchant
Marine and with it, the business for Argentine shipowners.
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4.3 The consequences on the national shipowner’s Fleet
It should be pointed out from the very beginning that when considering the national
shipowners’ fleets, ships with provisional suspension of flag, Decree 1772/91, and
chartered by resident shipowners, are considered as national for the purpose of the
analysis. Otherwise, there would be almost no fleet to consider at all.
As seen in chapter 2, the trend for the fleet was to diminish in number, while
increasing the age of the ships. This diminishing trend started before the deregulation
process, and the main reasons were the obsolescence of the fleet and their high
operative costs. In fact, one of the main arguments presented by both the government
and shipowners to implement the deregulation of the Merchant Marine was the
diminishing trend of the fleet and the actual possibility of its disappearance, due to its
lack of competitiveness. The belief of the government was that the deregulation of the
activity would on its own solve the problem of the decreasing number of units in the
fleet and all its associated problems.
In figure 14, the evolution of the number of units in the national fleet, shows that there
was already a trend towards diminishing, however, since 1991 the trend drastically
sharpened. Likewise, the average age of the vessels, had slowly been increasing since
1982. However, in the period 1989-1990 the trend produced an inflection point, only
to reverse again in 1991 (year of the deregulation).
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Figure 14 Source: Compendio Estadistico de la Navegacion
Argentine ships (includes, ships with provisional suspension of flag, Decree 1772/91, and chartered
by resident shipowners).
Therefore, it can easily be implied from the analysis that the deregulation process had
no beneficial effect on the number of units in the fleet, nor on the age of the ships. On
the contrary, it accelerated and magnified the already negative trends. Moreover,
figure 15 compares the evolution of the number of units with the evolution of the Gross
Registered Tonnage, and confirms every trend. The data used for the number of units in
the fleet are, of course, the same as in figure 14. Nevertheless, the comparison with the
G.R.T is very interesting. When comparing both, it can be seen that while the number
of units was steadily decreasing since 1979, the G.R.T has, with variations,
maintained and sometimes even increased in value. In fact, the horizontal line linking
the values for 1979 and 1990, indicates that, although with ups and downs, in 1990 the
value was almost the same as in 1979. This indicates, that the number of units was
reducing, but at the same time the size of the ships was increasing, compensating the
tonnage. However, from 1991 on, both values, the number of units and the G.R.T,
drastically dropped.
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Evolution of the G.R.T in relation to the Number of Units 
in the Argentine Fleet
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Figure 15 Source: Compendio Estadistico de la Navegacion
Consequently, the immediate conclusion is that the deregulation process had no
beneficial effect on the national fleet whatsoever. Therefore, the thesis sustained by the
government and the shipowners was definitely proved wrong in the real world.
Moreover, all the negative effects affecting the fleet until then were tremendously
increased and speeded up, which eventually will mean the end of the fleet. That leaves
us with the question, whether the real intentions of the deregulation process were the
ones stated or not.
4.4 The consequences and implications for the small shipowners
The small shipowners had previously been largely encouraged by the State, as they
were regarded as an important source of employment, and many of the bigger
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companies had started once as small ones. Therefore, the State supported their
activities both through the legal framework and economically as well. Before the
deregulation process came about, the smaller companies were an important part of the
shipping activities. They were usually concentrated in niches in the national and
international markets, mainly complementing the activities of the bigger ones. Through
the “Cargo reservation Law” their subsistence was granted, and the Merchant Marine
fund provided for acquisitions and newbuildings.
However, when the deregulation process came about, the small shipowners were not
able to isolate themselves from the new environment. Thus, they were affected in the
same way as the rest of the industry, but the effect the deregulation measures had on
them was much more grave and immediate. In fact, the first problem they had to face
was the abolition of all the protective economic and legal framework. Moreover, in a
totally deregulated market without any protection they were not able to survive for
long. Therefore, in the fear of being pushed out of business by the bigger players, they
sold their units to the big companies. There were, however, a few small companies,
very well established in certain niches of the market, who decided to battle, and were
able to survive.
The greater benefits were for the bigger players who were able to renew and increase
their fleets in advantageous conditions. Many a time, big companies bought smaller
ones just for the sake of eliminating potential competitors and to avoid the landing of
outsiders through those small companies. Furthermore, they were interested in the
domestic niche markets and this was the best opportunity to get into them.
As a natural outcome of the aforementioned facts, the great majority of the small
shipowners went out of business, as they were all of a sudden exposed to a situation
they were not prepared to cope with because they have never planned to face such a
situation in the first place. In addition to the naturally hostile environment of a
deregulated market, they had to face the pressure of the larger national and
international players on themselves. Finally, the disappearance of the small
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shipowners greatly reduced the number of players in the market moving towards a
natural oligopoly with a few big players only.
4.5 The National shipping balance
Concepts
Income
Freight earned for exports in national flag ships
Freight earned between foreign ports in national flag ships
Transport of non-resident people in national flag ships
Expenditures in national ports by national flag ships
Expenditure
Freight earned by foreign flag ships, for Argentine imports
Transport of resident people in foreign flag ships
Expenditures in foreign ports by national flag ships
Chartering of foreign vessels by national shipowners
Shipping Balance
Table 3 national shipping balance concepts
As a bottom line, it is interesting to see the economic status of the shipping business.
The concepts involved in calculating the national shipping balance are according to
table 3. As a way to evaluate how successful the shipping activity is today, a glance at
the national shipping balance gives a fairly accurate picture of how the business is
performing. The concepts involved within the shipping balance are total income, and
total expenditure, and the values are shown in figure 16.
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Figure 16  Source: Dcion. Nacional de cuentas Internacionales, de la secretaria de
programacion economica, del ministerio de economia y obras publicas.
The data shown in figure 16 indicate that up to 1990 the shipping balance was
positive, while in 1991 it was almost break even, with a very small profit. However,
since 1992 the shipping balance has shown increasingly negative results which
actually signifies that the expenses had increased a lot, because the income, although
slightly reduced, has been fairly steady since 1993. Therefore, the main cause for the
negative results are freights earned by foreign ships for the transport of Argentine
imports, and chartering of foreign ships by national shipowners.
In conclusion, it is clear that since the deregulation process was implemented the
whole shipping business went into a chaos, from which it will be very difficult, if not
impossible, to return. The main consequence that shipowners should care about is
nothing more and nothing less than the whole shipping business. What is in play is their
very existence. After understanding that, maybe they would take the right steps in
amending whatever is left of the fading Merchant Marine.
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Chapter Five
Summary Conclusions and Recommendations
It is clear to see that as a result of all the regulations applied Argentina has shown
every symptom of a highly regulated economy. The state was oversized, deficitary, and
showed elevated efficiency costs. Moreover, the high levels of inflation, reaching the
levels of hyperinflation in 1989, induced such devaluation that the currency almost
disappeared, putting the country at the limit of social disintegration.
The shipping activities as every other activity in the country, were indeed highly
regulated, expensive and very often inefficient. Therefore, there was a real and urgent
need for change. After experiencing hyperinflation, almost every citizen in the country
was conscious that it was time for a real change, and that remedies were to be sought
to the problems affecting the economy and economic activities. Thus, the deregulation
process came about sustained by three pillars, the structural reform of the state, the
privatisation policy, and the financial reform.
It can be said that the structural reform of the state was very successful in achieving its
structural objectives, however, the national public administration never reached the
expected level of performance mainly due to its lack of flexibility and deficient
management.
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The privatisation policy was very successful in reducing the state participation in all
areas not related to its core function, and represented a great financial help to push the
model forward. At the same time it lifted off the heavy burden of financing with
monetary emissions, the losses of the state owned companies, which was one of the
major sources of inflation. It can be concluded that privatisation opened the doors of
the international capital markets to Argentina, and facilitated the productive
restructuring of the country. It brought knowledge of the country to the external
markets, while accelerating the inflow of capital from around the world, which
reduced the necessity of monetary emission. The country risk was reduced to minimum
international levels.
However, the drawbacks were the lack of transparency in the privatisation processes,
the increasing tariffs after the privatisation to finance investments, and that the
regulating entities were not up to the task of defending the consumer’s interests. These
latter facts are raising great controversy and are potential sources for filing of claims.
The financial reform included opening up to the capital markets, and the adoption of
the convertibility law in 1991. It can be concluded that the adoption of the
convertibility law was the most successful issue, as it eliminated the possibility of
monetary emission for deficit financing or for any other reason whatsoever, thereby
eliminating inflation all at once. Opening the country to foreign markets, made possible
by the elimination of all restrictions and taxes on foreign investments.
In addition, foreign and domestic capitals were granted equal treatment under the law,
there were no prohibitions, or control over foreign currency, imports or exports of
goods and services, and an important cut in custom duties was made. In conclusion, the
financial reform was very complete and reached every objective. Moreover, it
successfully controlled the hyperinflation, which was the most difficult and
problematic matter.
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From the research, it is easy to deduct that the deregulation process was indeed a
necessity. However, the methodology used to push it forward became its main
drawback. In fact, it is clear that the willingness to implement the process was greater
than the attention paid to the way to do it. As a result, the methodology can be
categorised as far from correct and sometimes illegal. It has not been without harm to
the people and institutions specially the justice. Overruling the law, and endorsing it
by a partial Supreme Court of Justice was a very bad idea with unpredictable
consequences in the future. Therefore, although a necessary and awaited process, its
methodology lacked legitimacy and set the ground for future disputes.
The national merchant fleet, was slowly decreasing in number of units, gross tonnage,
and increasing in average age, while shipowners were more and more requesting
deregistration of the vessels from the national register. This fact was one of the main
arguments stated by shipowners, and national authorities as well, to press for the
deregulation of the activity. However, after the deregulation process, the problems
were not solved, but aggravated and accelerated instead. This indicates that regarding
the specific problems of the national fleet; the deregulation was not in the least the
solution of them.
However, in light of the results, nothing has been done so far to counteract the effects
of the deregulation over the fleet. If the statements made in the deregulation decrees
would have been true, the results were opposite to the objectives, but due to the lack
of action is correct to assume that the statements were just justifications, the
deregulation process being itself the one and only aim.
From the research it becomes evident that most of the consequences for the seafarers
were derived from the flagging out of the fleet to flags of convenience. The two main
problems were the reduction in the number of jobs increasing the unemployment among
crews, and the loss of the agreed labour and legal framework. It is also evident that all
the consequences were extremely negative for seafarers. The most detrimental were
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the inapplicability of all labour benefits, even the access to the very basic working
benefits, such as exclusion of the social security and pension fund system. Thus,
working conditions were not a matter of rights any more, but of good will on the part
of the shipowners.
What may be very significant, is the fact that the so-called " temporary cease of flag",
which was supposed to last for two years as a temporary measure, became permanent.
This measure granted many of the privileges of the national flag to outflagged ships,
however, none of those benefits, nor any other were granted to the Argentine crews. It
is evident on its own, that there was a bias in favour of the shipping companies and
against the seafarers in the whole process. For some reason, the government thought
that was the way to go, although it is not understandable or logical, except from the
point of view of the lobbying capacity exercised by the shipping companies.
Due to the sudden change and worsening in the working conditions, lack of jobs and
the policy implemented by shipping companies related to black listing of seafarers,
with law suits against shipping companies, there was a big number of seafarers that
quit the activity in order to retire or start different activities. Thus, the only seafarers
remaining would be those whose obligations would not allow them to quit right away.
In conclusion, the lack of jobs was balanced by a decreasing number of available
seafarers in the market. Moreover, the lack of seafarers is increasing to the point that it
has already become a problem the industry is facing.
The lack of seafarers, specially officers, will cause a loss of the know-how, while at
the same time getting people with the required technical knowledge for managerial
positions ashore will become an almost impossible task.
It became evident, that one of the main reasons of the shipping companies to pursue the
deregulation of the business was to get rid of the pressure exercised by the unions.
Thus, the deregulation was regarded by the shipowners as the most effective way to
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neutralise the union's power. The outcome confirmed their thoughts, as the unions were
really and badly weakened in their bargaining position.
Moreover, from the facts it is clear that most of the problems affecting the unions were
the same ones affecting the seafarers, as they are directly linked. The main outcome
was that the unions were badly weakened, specially by the loss of the whole
framework of labour agreements. The policy towards making Argentinean crew
dispensable, by means of enabling and facilitating its replacement by foreign crews
stated in the deregulation decrees, had a terrible effect, as it reduced the union's
capacity to negotiate to zero. Furthermore, it translated its effects to the ships still in
the national register. The latter demonstrated that the real aim was to weaken the
seafarers and unions' position as it is not understandable otherwise.
In conclusion, the policy of the government and the shipping companies towards the
unions was clear. They should be weakened as far as possible. In order to achieve that
objective they devoted their whole effort, the idea was to make unions dispensable. In
certain respects, they succeeded as, directly or indirectly, they reduced their
bargaining power and induced them an economic imbalance by means of reducing the
number of jobs, therefore reducing the unions' percentile income from their members'
wages. Moreover, they significantly reduced the affiliation rate in the ratings' unions,
although they were not able to do so in the officers' unions. The major political
outcome in this sense was the weakening of the unions' political and lobbying capacity.
However, the greatest harm done to the unions was undermining their members' trust in
their unions, being specially critical for ratings' unions. This fact may very well be the
preamble to their disintegration.
Finally shipowners thought that a scenario without the unions' pressure on them, with a
great reduction in manning costs, in a totally deregulated market would be the answer
to all their problems of competitiveness; however, reality proved otherwise. From the
results it is evident that the hypothesis sustained by government and shipowners, that a
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totally deregulated market would encourage competitiveness and that a healthier
merchant marine would arise from it, proved wrong in the real world.
The real facts were that the big companies took over the smaller ones, while at the
same time reducing their own structures. Hence, the number of players was drastically
reduced to a small amount, creating a situation of a natural oligopoly. Furthermore,
after the entrance to the market of global carriers such as Maersk line, the pattern is
repeating itself. This time the victims are the remaining big companies, therefore, the
trend is that the whole business would be in the hands of two or three foreign players,
while, the few remaining national shipowners, if any, would only be able to expect to
work in small niches in the market. It is obvious that the aforementioned facts are the
antithesis of the objectives established for the deregulation process.
It is interesting to see how mislead the national shipowners were when evaluating the
pros and cons of the deregulation process. In the short run, there were almost all
benefits. However, in the medium and long run their obsession for reducing crew costs
finally induced a shortage of seafarers, the consequences of which are yet to be
evaluated. The loss of the “cargo reservation law” meant that no certain business was
there for them anymore and that companies had to compete for the cargo. The loss of
the merchant marine fund, meant that no soft credits were available for newbuildings
or purchases. In summary, the loss of the state support and the entrance of global
competitors in a market they thought their own, made life extremely difficult for
national shipowners. Therefore, in the balance of what they gained and what they lost,
there were definitely more losses, but by the time they realised this, it was too late.
When analysing the case of the small shipowners, it is very sad to see that the segment
of the industry which was producing many jobs was driven altogether from the
business into the hands of the bigger players, which were eager to eliminate
competitors. However, the smaller units were sold out to foreign shipowners soon
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after the purchases, which meant that the only goal was to eliminate competitors and
reduce the market for the benefit of the bigger companies.
In conclusion, in the light of the trends and the figures, it can be said without hesitation
that, except for the reduction of state participation and the privatisations of the ports,
which were indeed successful, none of the other goals of the deregulation of the
merchant marine were achieved. Moreover, the Argentinean participation in the
national shipping business is constantly shrinking, while the business is going out of
the hands of the national shipowners and into the hands of only a few foreign
companies, thereby creating a great concentration and a dangerous dependence for the
country. Likewise, the net contribution of the shipping business to the balance of
payments is getting smaller year after year. Consequently, the shipping business is
becoming economically irrelevant for the country, due to its decreasing contribution to
the general economy. Moreover, it is not creating any jobs, on the contrary, it is
reducing employment. Therefore, politicians are regarding the activity as unimportant
and withdraw support and care from it, with the natural consequence that the shipping
business has lost its economical, political and strategic importance. Thus, all the
actors involved in the industry have become unimportant as well.
Finally, it is very clear that the power behind the deregulation of the Argentine
merchant marine has been the same political will that pushed forward the whole
deregulation process in Argentina. It is true that the Argentinean shipowners had
lobbied towards the deregulation of the merchant marine, however, they would have
got nothing if it was not for the fact that there was a strong political will in place at
that time. It can be implied in the light of the results that, if the arguments used to
support the deregulation decrees were really sincere, something should have been
urgently done to remedy the deleterious outcomes. However, nothing has been done so
far, and it does not look as if anything is going to be done. Therefore, it is correct to
imply that the government is not concerned about the fate of the Argentine merchant
marine. On the other hand, the shipowners themselves were the ones who asked for the
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deregulation. Therefore, they realise they have no moral right to ask for a change. In
conclusion, each and every argument supporting the deregulation as the solution to all
the problems formerly affecting the merchant marine, have crashed against reality.
Unless there is a real political interest to support the Argentinean merchant marine, the
only possible expectation is to assist in its funeral.
In the opinion of the author, the Argentine Merchant Marine as such, has passed its
point of non-return. In objective terms, there is almost no tonnage left. The few
remaining units are obsolete and the few nationally based companies still working are
unable to compete against the global carriers, and sooner or later they will be taken
over by them. Only certain niche markets have some prospect of surviving, such as the
coastal oil transport and inland waterway oil and sand transport. However, not even
these markets can be taken for granted, as there are no legal constraints for foreign
companies to enter these markets if they wish to, and they will certainly do so, if they
consider them commercially viable. On the other hand, it is evident, that there is no
political will to recover the Argentine Merchant Marine, and this fact is probably the
decisive one. Therefore, no matter how optimistic anyone may be, the real outcome is
clearly stating that the Argentine Merchant Marine is gone as such.
Recommendations
According to the statements of the deregulation decrees, it is in the interest of the
country to have a national Merchant Marine, thus, the actions taken were supposedly
oriented to improve its condition. The results are extremely negative, but still no
corrective action has been taken. There is a dichotomy between the words and the
actions taken. Therefore, decisions should be taken at the highest political levels in
order to decide whether it is in the interest of the country, or not, to have a national
Merchant Marine.
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If the decision taken is that the country must have a national Merchant Marine, it is
strongly recommended that urgent measures should be taken in order to reverse or
ameliorate the situation of the Argentine Merchant Marine after the deregulation
process.
The legal background of the deregulation process, needs a deep revision, because the
legal abuses committed during its implementation will be a great source of claims and
filing of suits in the near future, specially in the light of the results, and they may
jeopardise the whole process.
In implementing the revision of the legal framework, it is recommended that all
interested parties are included in such a revision, and that every party gives its own
point of view on the situation and contributes to reach a necessary consensus.
It is of paramount importance that a good revision is done to the good results, in order
to improve even further, and to the bad ones, in order to take corrective actions, with
the aim to achieve the original goals of the deregulation process.
Regarding the national fleet, urgent measures are required in order to enlarge its GRT.,
the number of units, and to include modern units. Special policies will be required to
implement it, whether using the old Merchant Marine fund, or some other instrument.
The legal framework will require special attention, in order not to over regulate or
create inequities. In order to promote the recovery of the tonnage, a tax reduction or
exemption benefits, instead of subsidies, is recommended. This has proved much more
efficient in countries like Greece. Moreover, this tax reduction/exemption has the
additional advantage of facilitating new ways for financing, such as leasing, which is
mainly based on taxation benefits.
It is evident that ships flying the national flag would require a different regime from
those of flags of convenience. Therefore, minimum regulations should be drafted and
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put in place, taking advantage of the knowledge gained from the problems before and
after the whole process.
Regarding the seafarers, if the national fleet recovers, the number of jobs would
increase by itself. Many of the seafarers who left will return. However, if the time of
recovery is too long, many of them may never return. Thus actions are required
immediately. Nevertheless, in the case of a sudden recovery of the tonnage, it would
indeed create a big manning problem, specially for getting senior officers and ratings
with adequate sea experience.
Therefore, in order to recover the lost seafarers for the activity, a new and modern
legal framework and labour agreements should be put in place. Once again, the former
experience should be included in the building of the new legal and labour framework.
As was mentioned before, in the opinion of the author, the Argentine Merchant Marine
as such, has passed away. Moreover, it would probably be an error to try to resurrect
it under the present conditions. On the other hand, to overcome the Decree 1772/91
would require a political influence and lobbying capacity which is totally out of the
question in the present situation. Likewise, to make shipowners sign agreements with
the unions in the present shipowners market is impossible. Hence, these two aims are
not achievable through political or union pressure. Even if unions take advantage of the
shortage of seafarers in the present market and use it as a pressing tool, it is dangerous
due to the possibility of a shift to foreign crews.
Therefore, if the unions and shipowners are still interested in doing whatever they can
to recover the Argentine Merchant Marine, it is important that the industry gets rid of
the Decree 1772/91 and enables the signing of agreements between unions and
shipowners. However, these goals will not be attained exercising any type of pressure
between the parties, but being creative. From the past experience it is clear that the
real engines of the industry have been the small companies. They were the ones
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creating more employment, job opportunities, and career prospects while at the same
time they proved to be the most pushy companies in the whole industry, not to mention
the fact that all large companies originally started as small ones. Therefore, the way to
go would be that the government should focus its efforts on supporting the activities of
the small companies. The key to restarting the Argentine Merchant Marine, is to create
a special legal framework for small companies parallel to the one currently in force,
not in contradiction but in addition to the existing one, in order to by-pass the
deregulation decrees. Moreover, under the new legal regime and the auspices of the
state, new working agreements should be signed between shipowners and unions. It is
clear that the state would have a significant role in making things happen; however, it
is in the interest of the state to have a healthy Merchant Marine and without the former
requisites nothing would pass the test of time.
A new national register for small shipowners should be created with the full support
of the state in terms of financing facilities, legal framework and export credits (or
similar), in order to enable newbuildings and acquisitions. If sufficiently supported the
small companies could rapidly boom and get control of all the niche markets,
enhancing and even enlarging them. In fact, quite a lot transportation that is done by
truck may be done by means of inland waterway transport, which may provide a really
cheap transport substitute, while at the same time creating new niche markets. To
conclude, the idea is not to fight a lost battle trying to get things back to the former
state of affairs, but to create something new that would enable the development of a
brand new and healthy Merchant Marine, to create new business for the shipowners
and at the same time a source of high quality jobs for the seafarers. Nevertheless,
nothing would be achieved if there is no will on the part of the government,
shipowners and unions.
Both shipowners and unions should radically change their attitudes towards each
other. It is of utmost importance that they see each other as necessary and
complementary, the perception of enemies to defeat should be something of the past. It
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would require from both a mature and professional attitude towards the business,
looking for original solutions to common problems. A better and constant
communication between companies and unions is essential to achieve optimum results.
The attitude towards the future will require co-operation and understanding as it has
been proved during the recent past, that no matter who is exercising the pressure on the
other, the business is finally suffering, and sooner or later both parties suffer the
consequences. Therefore, erasing the wounds of the past may be difficult, but it is
absolutely necessary for the sake of the Argentine Merchant Marine, which at the end
of the day is the cause of both parties.
Moreover, the trends and the figures are clearly saying that the Argentine Merchant
Marine is fading away and with it, the business for the shipowners, and the jobs for the
seafarers. Therefore, it is very important that all the actors in the shipping business,
unions and shipowners in the first place, work together to find solutions. Lobbying
should be done at all possible levels to obtain the necessary tools and support to help
the national Merchant Marine to recover from the deregulation consequences while
there is still time.
The bottom line would be that, although necessary in macroeconomic terms, the
deregulation was no panacea for all the problems in different areas. The total and
absolute deregulation of the national Merchant Marine did not bring any good, on the
contrary, it was the cause for all the coming problems. Therefore, the final
recommendation would be that a certain amount of regulation is necessary, however, it
must be kept to a minimum. On the other hand, all the accumulated experience during
the period before and after the deregulation should be wisely used in order to avoid
the same problems and obtain good results. Nevertheless, nothing will be achieved if
there is no political involvement, will, and support behind.
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                            State  Owned                             Private  Shipowners Total
YEAR Units G.R.T % of Total Av. age Units G.R.T % of Total Av. age Units G.R.T Av. age
1979 101 1,248,000 43.20 11.40 99 1,641,000 56.80 17.10 200 2,889,000 14.30
1980 95 1,295,076 42.18 9.80 102 1,775,158 57.82 17.50 197 3,070,234 14.00
1981 89 1,305,170 44.26 8.70 100 1,643,451 55.74 17.90 189 2,948,621 13.70
1982 92 1,389,064 47.96 9.10 95 1,507,528 52.04 15.90 187 2,896,592 12.50
1983 89 1,423,245 45.87 8.30 101 1,679,433 54.13 16.70 190 3,102,678 12.70
1984 84 1,427,844 43.84 8.50 108 1,828,849 56.16 16.30 192 3,256,693 12.70
1985 81 1,366,399 42.70 8.90 108 1,833,787 57.30 16.70 189 3,200,186 13.20
1986 76 1,256,255 39.64 8.70 102 1,912,570 60.36 16.90 178 3,168,825 13.50
1987 68 1,174,864 41.74 9.30 92 1,640,184 58.26 15.90 160 2,815,048 13.50
1988 65 1,157,569 42.78 9.80 91 1,548,255 57.22 17.60 156 2,705,824 14.10
1989 62 1,127,539 41.31 10.70 92 1,601,988 58.69 18.30 154 2,729,527 15.30
1990 62 1,141,984 39.30 11.30 90 1,733,409 60.70 17.10 152 2,875,393 14.80
1991 62 1,143,328 40.86 12.30 87 1,655,136 59.14 18.10 149 2,798,464 15.60
1992 55 1,051,302 43.35 13.20 78 1,373,770 56.65 18.00 133 2,425,072 16.10
1993 54 1,058,012 48.06 14.00 64 1,143,450 51.94 17.80 118 2,201,462 16.00
1994 29 468,254 24.05 14.79 75 1,479,043 75.95 17.08 104 1,947,297 16.50
1995 17 241,504 13.79 14.46 75 1,509,693 86.21 17.20 92 1,751,197 16.78
1996 13 175,410 9.72 14.75 74 1,628,379 90.28 17.31 87 1,803,789 17.01
1997 12 168,050 9.24 14.99 72 1,649,789 90.76 17.23 84 1,817,839 16.99
*1998 12 168,050 10.14 15.99 64 1,490,064 89.86 17.32 76 1,658,114 17.16
Annex 1. Fleet data
